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MiG 6 O’clock High
A History o f the Design Bureau and an Analysis o f its Aircrafts Combat History
Chairperson: Harry Fritz
MiG is known throughout the worldwide lexicon as synonymous with Soviet 
airpower. Its history is as decorated as the aircraft it has produced, yet the 
challenges faced by the fall o f  the Soviet Union may collapse this once proud 
company. While its future remains unclear, the history o f both MiG OKB, and the 
role its aircraft have played in combat, is clouded in mystery and intrigue.
Among Western military historians, MiG aircraft have l?een regarded as second- 
rate, a generation behind their Western counterparts. Since the end of World War 
II, many MiG’s have been downed by the guns of Western aircraft. Many believe 
this to be proof positive of their inferiority. There is a danger in this assumption, 
both for historian and strategists alike given that, aside from the air war in Korea, 
MiG’s have never operated in an environment for which they were designed.
Conflicts since Korea have placed MiG’s in an environment far removed from 
their intended role. Had they been utilized in the regimental sized formations 
against NATO forces in Europe and with the support o f a well trained GCI and 
C3 network, the MiG might perhaps be regarded differently.
This thesis will examine the history and nature of the MiG OKB as well as the 
environment o f Soviet military hardware acquisition. This study will enable an 
understanding o f a military hardware infrastructure far different than existed in 
the West during the Cold War. Furthermore, four cases studies o f conflicts in 
which MiG’s faced Western aircraft will be examined. These case studies will 
elucidate key issues MiG’s have faced as well as the reasons for both their failure 
and success. Examples of successes include iimovative tactics during Vietnam 
and high pilot proficiency during Korea, while the failures include poor C3 
networks over the Bekka Valley and in Gulf War I. However, the overriding 
theme of the case studies is pilot skill, or the lack thereof.
The goal o f this work is not to redeem the view of MiG in the eyes o f Western 
historians, rather too illuminate the key issues responsible for successful air 
combat.
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Introduction
MiG! The abbreviation o f the Mikoyan and Gurevich design bureau has 
become synonymous with any fighter aircraft built by the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War. Within Russia and Poland the word has entered gone beyond the 
spectrum o f aircraft and has entered the colloquial lexicon; it is applied to 
anything that is unusually swift or flashy.^ This association is not accidental. For 
over forty years MiG has the premiere fighter bureau o f the Soviet Union/Russia. 
MiG’s fame beginning with the MiG-1, designed in a time of seemingly 
impending doom during the Patriotic War and continuing to this day vsdth the 
MiG-29, has survived even the founding designers’ deaths in the 1970’s. Its work 
has consistently represented the state of the art technology of the Soviet Union, 
whether it be the nimble MiG-3 over the skies of Eastern Europe or the lightning 
fast MiG-25 over Siberia and Israel.
Until recently, MiG has enjoyed a level of recognition and prominence 
realized by no other aircraft design bureau the world over. Only in today’s 
capitalistic Russia has MiG begun to fall from its pillar of grace. A free market 
economy is doing what NATO never got a chance to by destroying the foremost 
design bureau o f the Soviet Union. But understanding MiG’s rapid ascension to 
prominence is futile without a concise history of the Soviet/Russian Air Force 
from inception to present day.
 ̂ Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f  the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg 5
Chapter I
Brief History of the Soviet Air Force^
It is claimed that Russia’s interest in military aviation began in 1831 
when the military governor of Riazon attended the country’s first balloon flight. 
Official acceptance within military circles came with the creation of the creation 
of a Commission on the Use of Aeronautics for Military Purposes, endorsed by 
General D.A Mulituin in 1869.^ This commission investigated and eventually 
accepted the role of balloons as artillery spotting platforms. Throughout the latter 
half o f the 19**̂  century, various schools and training facilities were built to 
achieve this end. The Russo-Japanese War validated the balloon as an effective 
observation and reconnaissance platform.
Soon after the war, news of the Wright brothers’ successful heavier-than- 
air flight in North Carolina reached Czar Nicholas II and his ministers. Since no 
indigenous aircraft manufacturers existed in Russia at that time, the Czar ordered 
aircraft and power plants were purchased from France. In addition, very few 
Russian pilots were proficient enough to instruct new pilots. To learn and create a 
cadre able to train future personnel, new Russian pilots and ground crewman were 
sent to France. This relation with France dictated a reliance on fcHK*ga hardware 
during the first years o f World War I.
 ̂The Soviet Navy also has a long and distinguished history o f  aviation, including long range 
bomber assets and since the latter part o f  the 1970’s a small carrier based fleet. However, for the 
purpose o f  this paper the focus will be on the VVS because it is the main recipient o f MiG aircraft. 
It should be noted that recently MiG has made its first foray into naval aviation with the carrier 
based MiG-29K for the Indian N avy’s ex-Soviet Kiev class aircraft carrier.
 ̂ ibid pg 11
Russian aircraft performed poorly in the first years o f the Great War. In 
part this was due to Russia’s lack o f domestically produced aircraft. Sourcing 
spare parts for Russia’s fleet o f 250 aircraft in the early part of WWI was nearly 
impossible. Domestically developed replacement were often far inferior to foreign 
components. This led to nearly half o f Russia fleet o f 250 aircraft being 
unserviceable at the outbreak of hostilities."^ Most of these aircraft were used for 
observation rather then combat, as were most planes in either side’s inventory.
The birth of Russian fighter aviation can be traced to a July 4, 1916. In 
response to German fighter effectiveness on the Western Front, the Soviet Union 
began arming planes as fighters. The shining light of Russian aviation during this 
period was the success of Sikorsy’s Ilia Mur omet bomber. These bombers flew 
an impressive 442 missions, delivered 2,000 bombs, took 7,000 photographs and 
lost only three out of a fleet of forty to hostile fire, an impressive deed.^ However 
the fledgling Russian Air Force could not overcome its reliance on foreign made 
aircraft or its poor maintenance record. By the Revolution of 1917, it was hardly 
an effective fighting force.
After the Revolution of 1917, the Soviets immediately began to overhaul 
the air force. They renamed it the Red Army Aviadarm (Air Fleet) and place(^ it 
under the control o f the army, a precedent that continues to this day. Newly 
cleaned o f counter-revolutionaries, the Soviets used the new Soviet Air Fleet to 
great effect during the Civil War. During the War with the Whites over 19,000 
sorties were flown, 208,0001bs of bombs were dropped as well as 19,0001bs of
^ ibid pg 12 
 ̂ ibid pg 14
propaganda leaflets. The Air Fleet was employed on all fronts during the war and 
its success secured its continued funding and interest.
The Soviets sought to end their reliance on foreign built aircraft during the 
1920’s. They invited German companies such as Junkers to build, and partially 
man, factories inside the Soviet Union. In return the Germans found a way to get 
around the restrictive Versailles treaty by secretly developing and testing aircraft 
in Lipestk, 250 miles southwest o f Moscow. The deal proved fruitful for both 
parties. The newly formed Soviet Air Force (VVS) gained experience and 
hardware and the Germans, an opportunity to rebuild the Luftwaffe.
During this time relations on the Chinese border were souring, and 
skirmishes broke out among border units. In 1929, thirty four VVS aircraft 
participated in skirmishes along the border soundly defeating the Chinese in the 
air and on the ground. This was one of the first uses of Soviet air power outside of 
the borders o f the Soviet Union and its success would bode well for the VVS.^ 
However the Soviet Union’s success against the Chinese convinced the Japanese 
to invade Manchuria to protect her northern flank, a move that would result in a 
clash between Tokyo and Moscow.
War was also raged on the Iberian Peninsula. Franco and his Nationalist 
forces threatened the Republicans, backed by the monarchy and in 1936 Stalin 
delivered aid to the beleaguered Republican forces. Aid came in the form of 
volunteer troops, tanks, munitions and aircraft. The Soviet aircraft industry had 
been hard at work during the 1930’s producing such aircraft as the SB-2,1-15 and
 ̂ Soviet airpower had also been employed during the punitive skirmishes wfffi^PoTkncf in 1920.
1-16. All o f these aircraft were improvements over previous designs, but were 
rapidly becoming obsolete.
Hitler’s decision to send the famed Condor Legion of Me-109s, He-111’s 
and Ju-87’s to Spain in 1937 turned the tables rapidly. Losses soon became 
prohibitively heavy. Stalin used this as an excuse to withdraw his support from 
the International Brigade. During the same time, the Japanese invasion of China 
threatened Siberia. This forced Stalin to give material aid in the form of munitions 
and mercenaries to the Chinese, including aircraft and pilots who suffered heavily 
under the guns o f Japanese Zeroes.
In the midst o f the war in Spain and the threat of Japanese invasion, Stalin 
ignited ludicrous military purges. The VVS was not immune , such high ranking 
officers as the Chief of the VVS Yakov Alksnis and Leningrad Air Commissar 
Lopatin were executed. By the time Germany and the Soviet Union invaded 
Poland, nearly 75% of the VVS senior officers had been shot.^ Not only was this 
disastrous for the VVS, but it decimated the Soviet aircraft design bureaus, their 
supporting government agencies and the factories.
With the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty on August 23 1939, the 
Soviet Union was obligated to become a participant in the next war. When 
German troops moved across the Polish fi'ontier on 1 September 1939, the Soviet 
Union was unable to follow suit. It was not until September 18^ that Soviet forces 
moved into their sector of Poland. The Luftwaffe had already decimated the small 
Polish Air Force and the VVS did little during the invasion. However, the next
7 ;ibid pg 15
stage o f the war would find the VVS at the forefront. 3,000 aircraft were deployed 
in support of the Soviet invasion of Finland.
However the purges and lack of progressive thinking in it ranks, coupled 
with increasingly outdated aircraft proved disastrous for the VVS. Nearly one 
third o f the deployed aircraft were destroyed, with the remaining two thirds 
unable to operate effectively due to weather and enemy action. This poor showing 
led to a re-organization o f the VVS into five new commands: the Long-Range 
Bomber Aviation (Dal ’nebombardirvochnaia Aviatsiia or DBA), Air Reserve 
Component (Avaitsiia osbogo naznacheniia or AON), Frontal Aviation {W S  
Fronta), Army Aviation (W S  Armii) and Corps Aviation {Korpusnye 
avaieskadril). The Soviet Air Force was still in the midst of these reforms when 
Hitler initiated Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 
1941.
Though Stalin had been warned of the impeding invasion through his spy, 
Richard Sorge in Tokyo, as well as several Western intelligence agencies, he 
refused to accept the news. As a result Soviet aircraft were still lined up neatly on 
the taxiways of the western approaches to the Soviet Union, making easy targets 
for Luftwaffe Stuka dive bombers. During the first day alone 1,489 Soviet aircraft 
were destroyed on the ground and within a week, 4,000 VVS aircraft had been 
lost.^ The only good news was that pilot losses were relatively light, since most of 
the aircraft had been on the ground when they were destroyed.
The Soviets did have new aircraft such as the high altitude MiG-3 and IL- 
2 Shturmovik ground attack bombers. They were on par, technologically, with the
www.centennialofflight.gov/essays/Air_Power/Russia/AP21 .htm
Luftwaffe’s aircraft. The crews of these aircraft were trained in the regimented 
fashion of the purges, however and failed to capitalize on their advantages, They 
were easily picked off by the superior Luftwaffe pilots It was on the Eastern Front 
that the highest kill tallies realized were achieved. Werner Molders flying an Me- 
109 became the first pilot ever to surpass the 100 kill mark and Erich Hartmann 
became the highest ranking ace ever with over 352 kills, all against Soviet 
aircraft. It was not until the Battle o f Moscow that the VVS received any kind of 
reprieve from the slaughter it was receiving from the guns of Georings Luftwaffe.
The harshness of the Russian winter eventually stopped the Wehrmacht 
drive to Moscow in December of 1940. The Luftwaffe too was paralyzed. Engines 
would not start, hands froze to tools and oil became thick. The VVS, invigorated 
with reinforcements sent from the Far East Military District and Lend Lease 
aircraft, began to seize the initiative and wrest control of the skies firom the 
Luftwaffe. The Battle for Moscow was the turning point in the air war over the 
Eastern Front. Never again would the Luftwaffe to operate with such impunity. 
Hitler, realizing he could not take Moscow, diverted his troops south into Ukraine 
and towards the oil rich Caucuses.
Stalingrad became the epicenter o f the war. During the offensive to 
encircle and trap the German Sixth Army, the Soviets massed 24 air divisions and 
99 regiments in support of the pincher movement. The VVS conducted air support 
for the army and fighter patrols over the city to hinder German re-supply efforts. 
During the winter of 1942-43 the VVS claimed over 1,100 Luftwaffe aircraft
destroyed.^ The VVS succeeded in cutting off the encircled German Army from 
the air forcing General von Paulus to surrender on February 3, 1943. After 
Stalingrad, the VVS never again lost control of the skies over the front and 
maintained nearly complete air superiority through mass numbers. More 
importantly, the army had learned the lesson of air support and fully half of the 
missions flown by the VVS were in direct support of ground troops. By late 1944, 
German aircraft on the Eastern Front numbered 1,850, of which less then 400 
were fighters. In comparison the VVS had a strength of nearly 17,000 aircraft. 
During Battle for Berlin, the finale of the war in Europe, the VVS flew over
91,000 sorties, destroying over 1,100 Luftwaffe aircraft with the claimed loss of 
only 527.*®
With the fall of Berlin and the end of war with Germany, Stalin honored 
the Yalta conference and on August 8 1945 he declared war on Japan. Soviet 
forces decimated the Japanese in Manchuria and North Korea, making landings in 
the Kuril and Shaklin islands as well. Japanese aircraft were no match for the 
W S  and suffered heavily. Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945 and the 
greatest war the world had ever known came to an end. The statistics for the VVS 
during the war were phenomenal. 3.8 million sorties were flown, nearly 700,000 
tons o f bombs were dropped and 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants expended 
while building over 8,000 airfields. The Soviet Union also claimed more then
 ̂Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f  the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg 
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77,000 Luftwaffe destroyed, 44,000 to the guns o f the VVS. Costs were also 
great, more then 80,000 VVS aircraft fell to Luftwaffe guns/^
The nuclear age brought about yet another re-organization of the VVS. 
Stalin sought to develop an extensive air defense network and an indigenous 
nuclear capability. In response to the threat posed by American intercontinental 
bombers, Stalin created the Air Defense Command {Protivovozdushnaya oborona 
or PVO) responsible for the defense of Soviet airspace. Stalin’s re-organization of 
the VVS received a major windfall in 1947, the British government offered to sell 
the Soviet Union twenty five Roll Royce Nene and thirty Rolls Royce Derwent 
turbojet engines. This offer allowed the Soviets to hurdle past the problems 
associated with domestic jet engine development. These engines were put to good 
use, and soon aircraft capable o f intercepting the newest generation of American 
bombers were developed, the most significant was the MiG-15 (NATO codename 
FAGOT).
North Korea burst across the border with South Korea on June 25^ 1950, 
beginning the Korean War. The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) did very well 
against the inferior South Koreans, but with the arrival of the American Far 
Eastern Air Force the NKAF was nearly annihilated. As the UN forces advanced 
towards the Yalu River, China began to feel pressured from the south and asked 
the Soviet Union for help to modernize her armed forces. Not wanting to become 
directly involved in the war, Stalin gave China a large number of MiG-15’s to 
augment its small air force. The M iG-15 was far superior to anything the UN had 
in Korea at the time. By November however, the Americans began to introduce 
" ibid
the F-86A Sabre to the Peninsula. The F-86 was more than a match for the 
Chinese piloted MiG-15’s with the Americans achieving a kill ratio of 15 to 1. 
Soviet/Warsaw Pact pilots did take part in dogfights with the Americans. They 
were far more proficient and deadly then their Chinese and North Korean 
counterparts. The lessons learned by these pilots benefited future generations of 
Soviet fighters.
After Stalin’s death in 1953, the VVS focus shifted towards strategic 
nuclear warfare. Long-range TU-95 (NATO codename BEAR) and TU-16 
j(NATO codename BADGER) bombers were developed and high speed 
interceptor aircraft such as the MiG-21 (NATO codename FISHBED) were 
introduced. The VVS also received control o f many newly developed IRBM and 
ICBM missile systems. Invasion of Soviet airspace by U-2 aircraft in the late 
1950’s prompted a build-up of surface to air missile sites throughout the country. 
In the 1960’s with the development of the XB-70 Valkyrie, the Soviet created 
such aircraft as the Mach 3+ capable MiG-25 (NATO codename FOXBAT) to 
intercept them.
Aid to friendly nations in the Middle East such as Egypt and Syria stepped 
up in the early 1960’s. The Middle East and Vietnam became the laboratories for 
Soviet aircraft and weapons designers. As American-made Israeli aircraft and 
Soviet-made Arab aircraft dueled in the skies over the Sinai, the vast Soviet-built 
air defense network of North Vietnam tested American strike aircraft. The Middle 
East was of great interest to the VVS. Since the end of the Great Patriotic War, 
the focus had been on defensive fighters and offensive missile and bomber forces.
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The Six Day War, however, taught the VVS the importance of tactical aircraft, 
capable of supporting troops and striking defended targets close to the lines. This 
led to the development of aircraft such as the MiG-23/27 (NATO codename 
FLOGGER), SU-24 (NATO codename FENCER) and SU-25 (NATO codename 
FROGFOOT) as tactical support aircraft.
Focus began to shift from a global war to regional conflicts. The Soviet 
Union became embroiled in the war in Afghanistan. The war against the 
mujahedin was a new type of war for the Soviet Union. Much like the US in 
Vietnam, the Soviet Union was unable to bring firepower to bear on an elusive 
enemy. Consequently, the only large role the VVS took part was rotary winged. 
The MI-24 (NATO codename HIND) and MI-8 (NATO codename HIP) 
helicopters bore the brunt of the combat and transport roles in Afghanistan, 
moving troops and attacking rebel positions. They suffered considerably. The 
only fixed wing combat involvement of the VVS was with Su-25’s and ground 
attack versions of the MiG-21 attacking mujahadien positions. The VVS learned 
much from its role in Afghanistan and its successor, the Russian Air Force is 
applying these lessons in Chechnya.
In anticipation of the nuclear war with NATO, the Soviets deployed their 
best units to Eastern Europe during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Frontal Aviation units 
were on call twenty four hours day to repel an invasion of Warsaw Pact airspace 
and strike tactical targets in Western Europe. In addition, Soviet nuclear armed
Combat did occur on a number occasions when Soviet/Afghan MiG-21 and -23 aircraft strayed 
into Pakistani airspace and were engaged by the PAF. Long Range Aviation also did participate in 
a few strategic bombing operations within Afghanistan from bases near Dushanbe. Source 
www.acig.org
I I
bombers were constantly on alert to strike targets in the continental US. The PVO 
was to intercept incoming American bombers and fighters. This constant state of 
readiness was taxing on the VVS and by the late 1980’s, it could no longer 
maintain this state of readiness. It was in this situation that the Soviet Union broke 
apart and the VVS’s aircraft were divided up among the new republics, with 
Russia and Ukraine getting the lion’s share o f hardware.
The future of Russian air power is unknown. Gulf War I proved the fallacy 
of a Soviet air defense system. With little money and dwindling export markets 
for its aircraft, the Russian Air Force has little room to re-equip and re-organize 
itself. This is where MiG and all other design bureaus in Russia are today, 
separated from the system they were founded and prospered under.
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Chapter II
Soviet Bureau System of Aircraft Development
Soviet era design OKB bureaus {Opytno Konsrtuktorskoe byuro or 
Experimental Design Bureaus) whether designing missiles or nuclear submarines, 
operated in an environment foreign to Western designers. The first Soviet aviation 
design bureaus were founded during the first Five Year Plan in 1928 by Andrei 
Tupolev and Nikolai Polikarpov respectively. These design two firms, headed 
both by TsAGI {TsentraVni aerogirdrodinamicheskii institut or Central Air and 
Hydrodynamics Institute) graduates, formed the nucleus for tbp all large aircraft 
design bureaus to come. After the pitiful performance of Polikarpov designs in 
Spain against the German Me-109, the newly formed Commissariat of Aviation 
decided to take the best talent from each to form new firms. It was hoped this 
action would bypass the stagnation these two firms were experiencing. The new 
firms, headed by Aleksander Yakolev (Yak), Arytom Mikoyan and Mikhail 
Gurevich (MiG), Syemyen Lavochkin (LaGG), Pavel Sukhoi (Sukhoi) and Sergei 
Ilyushin (Ilyushin) created new advanced aircraft such as the MiG-1 and -3, 
LaGG-3, Yak-3 and 11-2 Shturmovik. It was these aircraft that served as the 
backbone of the VVS throughout the Great Patriotic War.
The Second World War saw the beginning o f another trend in Soviet 
aircraft design, reverse engineering. Aleksander Yakolev in his memoirs. Notes o f  
an Aircraft Designer, admitted that “copying foreign models was a necessary
13
Thanks to the Lend-Lease act the flood of American and British aircraft 
numbered more then 17,000^^ giving Soviet designers the chance to reverse 
engineer many features, such as superchargers, engine control systems and lead 
computing sights. Perhaps the most infamous case o f Soviet reverse engineering 
was the Tupolev TU-4 (NATO codename BULL), a rivet by rivet copy of the 
American B-29 Superfortresses. The Soviet Union had “interned” many B-29’s in 
Vladivostok after the Superfortresses had made emergency landings following 
raids on Japan. This reverse engineering feat gave the Soviet Union 
intercontinental bombing capability well ahead of a domestically designed 
aircraft. Perhaps the most important gift to Soviet aircraft designers was windfall 
of fifty Rolls-Royce jet engines from Britain in 1947. These reversed engineered 
je t engines powered the first two generations of Soviet jet powered fighter aircraft 
and allowed the Soviets to hurdle past the problems of developing an 
indigenously designed jet engine program. This windfall is perhaps the most 
important event in Soviet fighter aircraft design. Reverse engineering continued 
until the early 1980’s when Soviet designers came up with aircraft such as the 
SU-25 (NATO codename FROGFOOT), MiG-29 (NATO codename FULCRUM) 
and SU-27 (NATO codename FLANKER). These aircraft, though highly 
advanced and utizliting some notably Soviet designs, are still reliant on reverse 
engineered Western designs.
Yakolev, Aleksander Notes on an Aircraft Designer pg 228
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f  the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg 
28
Other prominent examples o f  reverse engineering include the AA-2 missile (NATO codename 
ATOLL), essentiality a copy o f  a AJM-9B Sidewinder reverse engineered when a Chinese MiG 
pilot was hit by a Sidewinder from a Taiwanese F-86. Luckily for the MiG pilot, the m issile failed 
to explode and the missile was recovered in good condition. For the sake o f  brevity only the most 
blatant examples have been discussed.
14
Soviet design bureaus operated in an environment devoid of financial 
concerns. Feasibility was dictated by resource availability. In comparison to 
Western design firms, there were no foreign or domestic costs associated with 
marketing or production. In addition, there was one singular customer, the MoD 
(Ministry of Defense), responsible for all military hardware procurement o f the 
armed services in the Soviet Union. Even commercial aircraft design was 
managed through the MoD, as all Aeroflot aircraft were under the control of the 
VVS in time o f war. With only one customer, however, creative designs did not 
fare well and a clear evolution of aircraft developed. This led to Soviet aircraft 
design stagnation and a lack of proactive research.
Designers in the Soviet Union were driven by what is called a 
“requirement pull”, a design was created in order to counter an existing threat. 
Western designers on the other hand were driven by a “technology push”, the uses 
for the newest developed technology were researched extensively. A classic 
example of this divergence in motivation can be found in the development of 
Look-Down-Shoot-Down-Radar^^ (LDSD) systems by each country. The US 
developed this technology in the early 1960’s, well before the Soviets had aircraft 
capable of low altitude, high speed penetrations. The LSDS system was ordered 
into production as the AWG-9 Phoenix system, even though no threat yet existed. 
The Soviets chose not to implement LDSD systems until Western powers had 
aircraft capable of low altitude, high speed penetration in the mid 1970’s, even
LDSD systems can detect an aircraft at a low (sub 1,000ft) altitude, distinguish it fi-om 
surrounding ground radar clutter and launch a missile at it, all while the launch aircraft maintains a 
higher altitude. It is particularly useful in engaging all weather, terrain following aircraft such as 
the F -111, B -IB , SU-24 or terrain masking helicopters.
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though the Soviet were capable o f deploying a system a decade earlier. Other 
examples include the MiG-25 (designed to counter the XB-70 Valkyrie and later 
the A -12 Oxcart and SR-71) and the MiG-27 (designed as a tactical fighter 
bomber after lessons learned in Arab-Israeli and Vietnam Wars). It was not until 
the late 1970’s and early 80’s that the Soviet design environment allowed for a 
measure of proactive research. It is perhaps no coincidence that as Soviet 
designers began to break away from the pattern of reverse engineering and create 
a generation of Soviet fighters that included advanced indigenous technology, the 
“technology push” was finally realized. Aside from why technology is 
implemented in new design, the Soviets had a system not surprisingly, very 
different from the west. A central committee known as MAP {Ministerstvo 
aviatsionnoi promyshlennosti or Ministry fo r Aircraft Production) coordinated all 
requirements originating from the MoD for aircraft development.
MAP was responsible for all aspects of Soviet aircraft design under which 
the Soviet design bureaus fall. It created manuals based on aspects such as 
propulsion, airframe, avionics and fire-control. These manuals were given to the 
respective bureaus as guidelines for design. This is why many Soviet aircraft 
share such similarities such as air inlet design, undercarriage position and 
cockpits. Another aspect of MAP is advanced flight research. In this capacity it 
is roughly equivalent to NASA, but has a much more active role in input in new 
designs then does its American counterpart. MAP takes the financial burden of
Examples o f  this change to proactive design include the helmeted mounted IR sights on the 
MiG-29, the phenomenal maneuverability o f  the SU-27 due to thrust vectoring nozzles and a 
break from GCI (Ground Control Intercept) dependence.
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flight testing and research off the bureaus, but in return limits their autonomy. 
Under MAP there is an organization that has no equivalent in the Western world, 
the TsKB (TsentraVnoe konstruktorskoe byuro or Central Construction Bureau).
The TsKB was the main conduit through which all requests for new 
hardware flowed. When a request was made from the MoD, the TsKB made a 
feasibility study to decide whether the project is worth pursuing with reference to 
available resources, i.e. engines, avionics, airframe, raw material and labor. After 
the feasibility study had been completed by TsKB, a check with both the customer 
(MoD) and MAP occurred and the design was approved, the outline was then 
given to the actual design bureaus. The role o f the TsKB in the world of Soviet 
aircraft design is essential. It injected the entire process with a sense of 
competition. It created he incentive to make a better aircraft in a Soviet industrial 
world dominated by quantity over quality. What is unique in the Soviet system is 
that the TsKB headed a group of organizations that were in direct competition 
with each other for resources and contracts.
Design bureaus not only design the aircraft, but after approval from the 
TsKB built a small number of prototypes. These prototypes were, with the help of 
MAP, tested rigorously before final approval from the MoD, TsKB and MAP.^^ 
The bureaus themselves did not, in the fashion of western manufacturers, build 
their own production aircraft. The workshop at MiG’s Zhukovsky testing facility 
is typical o f most OKB’s in that space allowing the construction of only two 
aircraft simultaneously. After the flight testing and finalization of plans for the
Please refer to appendix for a flow chart o f Soviet Military Aircraft Acquisition. Courtesy o f  
General Dynamics via Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A Historv o f  the Design Bureau 
and Its Aircraft
17
production aircraft, plans, tooling and expert technicians are sent to one of the 
many GAZ’s (Gosudarstewny aviatsionny zavod or State Aircraft Factory). 
MiG’s assigned GAZ is, and continues to be, number 30^  ̂at Khodinkna in 
Moscow. It employed over 30,000 people directly involved with aircraft 
manufacture and 3,000 others manufacturing such items as kitchen appliances and 
furniture. The factory covers 618 acres and contains 26,909,675 sq ft of floor 
space!
Flight testing and delivery to either VVS or foreign forces occurred at 
adjacent Lukhovsky airfield. Flight testing was done in three stages, the first 
being plant flight testing, flown by factory pilots, the second, design testing, 
flown by a combination of military and factory pilots and finally state acceptance 
testing, flown exclusively by military pilots. The aircraft OKB system of 
awarding contracts and designs began to change again during the perestroika 
period of Gorbachev, but little information exists before the collapse o f the Soviet 
Union. Today, OKB’s in Russia are struggling to cope with a new free market 
economy. MiG has not sold an aircraft to the VVS in many years and this problem 
will be discussed at the conclusion of this work. The history of the company is 
somewhat akin to the story of the Phoenix, as it rose to take flight from the ashes 
of the great OKB, Polikarpov, during the Second World War.
Interesting to note is that Lenin’s glass covered casket was built at the same factory after his 
death in 1924.
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Chapter III
The Creation and History of MiG OKB
During the 1920’s and 30’s the design firm headed by Nikolai 
Nikolayevich Polikarpov was the undisputed design champion of Soviet fighter 
planes. Having been arrested in 1929 and sent the gulags, Polikarpov was freed in 
1933 to help modernize and expand the VVS. His firm designed the 1-15 biplane 
and 1-16 monoplane, which would form the backbone of the VVS until after the 
opening stages of the invasion of the Soviet Union. The first combat test for these 
aircraft came in 1936-37 during the Spanish Civil War. Achieving early 
supremacy over the underpowered early Me-109's and Fiat CR.32’s, Polikarpov 
was congratulated for his design. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the Me-109 was a 
new aircraft and still engaged in teething problems. The Messerschmitt Company, 
designers o f the Me-109, soon overcame these by equipping new 109’s with an 
upgraded Daimler Benz engine and a 20mm spinner firing cannon,^^ Polikarpov 
aircraft were very quickly unable to compete and were withdrawn from combat by 
late 1937.
Eager to overcome the problems his aircraft had experienced over Spain, 
Polikarpov designed and built a replacement, the 1-153. The 1-153, while 
incorporating state of the art technologies such as a retractable undercarriage, was 
still a biplane and suffered accordingly. Notwithstanding thier excellent turn rate 
and stability, biplanes are inherently slower then their monoplane counterparts. 
This problem was obvious in combat with early Japanese Zeroes over Mongolia, 
ibid pg 39
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The 1-153’s suffered greatly at the hands of the superior Japanese aircraft, 
infuriating Stalin.^^
After meeting with Stalin, Polikarpov began designing a high speed 
monoplane to equip the VVS. He produced a prototype of the 1-180 high speed 
monoplane quickly and tests of the new aircraft commenced. The testing was to 
become the doom of Polikarpov. The first test flight by Soviet national hero 
Valeriy Chaklov, ended in disaster when the aircraft crashed and killed him. 
Although the problem had nothing to do with the design (the aircraft was left 
uncovered all night in -24C weather and the engine seized soon after takeoff), 
Polikarpov took the loss hard. When the following two prototypes crashed due to 
unrelated problems, Polikarpov became convinced of his inferiority. As these 
incidents took place during Stalin purges, allegations of sabotage naturally arose. 
Many people in the firm and factory that produced the 1-180 were never heard 
from again. It is a mystery how Polikarpov avoided implication, as many people 
including the chief designer, Tomashyevich, were executed.^"^ The firm never 
recovered from this disaster. Polikarpov was then sent to Germany as part of a 
Soviet delegation to gather German aircraft technology. It was during his absence 
that the team that would become MiG OKB was formed.
For some time the Polikarpov OKB had been working on a project simply 
called “Project X” (Kh in Russian), a high speed, maneuverable well armed 
monoplane somewhat along the lines of the German M E-109. The NKAP 
{Narodni kommisariat aviatsionnnoiipromyshlennost or Peoples Commissariat
Gimston, Bill and Gordon, Yefim MiG Aircraft Since 1937 pg 8 
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fo r  the Aircraft Industry) learned of this project and decided to hasten it 
completion, by forming an OKO (experimental design department) within the 
Polikarpov OKB. On December 8, 1939 the new OKO was established, headed by 
the bright young Arytom Mikoyan and his deputy Mikhail Gurevich, both 
employees o f Polikarpov OKB. The Yakolev bureau had also been at work on a 
similar project. Upon its completion in 1939 it was expected to go into 
production. Yet the OKO headed by Mikoyan promised a higher top speed than 
the Yakolev. After much wrangling with the NKAP, Stalin was convinced to wait 
for the completion of aircraft X. After all, Stalin was convinced speed in aircraft 
was everything.
Anushavan (Arytom) Ivanoich Mikoyan was bom in the village of Sanain 
near the Turkish border with Armenia on August 5^ 1905. When war broke out 
with Turkey in 1914, Mikoyan's family, along with most other Armenians in the 
area, were convinced the Turks would invade and slaughter ethnic Armenians. 
These fears lead to a mass movement of Armenians away from the border. 
Mikoyan would never return, instead settling with his family in Tbilisi in nearby 
Georgia. His brother, Anastas became very involved with the Bolshevik party 
during the war and in 1915 joined the party. He soon met and befriended a young 
Joseph Dzhugashvili. This friendship would bear fruit for both Mikoyan’s 
brothers later in life.^^
Arytom’s brother by 1946 was the deputy premier o f  the Soviet Union and the vice chairman o f  
the Council o f  Ministers. He retained this role through Khrushchev reign, even being awarded the 
position o f  Trade Minister. His position close to Stalin was perhaps the reason Arytom was not 
implicated in the purges and his firm escaped Stalin’s rule with little damage. Anastas’s position 
as trade minister in the 1950’s and 60 ’s undoubtedly helped M iG’s foreign sales and allowed it 
first choice o f  imported resources.
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Arytom was accepted into a Tbilisi high school in 1918 and upon 
completion o f school, joined the Communist party. He moved to Moscow to work 
as a lathe operator in a factory, contracted tuberculosis and nearly died. Through a 
miracle of sorts, he was able to fight off the disease and make a recovery. While 
working in the “dynamo” factories o f Moscow, Arytom became passionate about 
Communist ideals and was called upon to serve a secretarial function for the 
Party. Soon after he began the position, however, he was called to serve in the 
Red Army. He served in the infantry until he received a commission at the Frunze 
Academy. After his release from the Army, young Mikoyan was asked to enter 
the VVA (Soviet Air Force Academy), where he studied at the Zhukovsky 
Aeronautics Institute, pursuing a degree in aircraft design. During his time at the 
Academy, Arytom became an accomplished parachutist, no small feat in the late 
1930’s, and pilot. Part of his studies at Zhukovsky required an internship at an 
OKB and Arytom was sent to Kharkov and the design bureau of D P Grigovich.^^ 
In Kharkov, Arytom, along with some friends, built an ultra light aircraft, 
the Oktyabrenok (named for the organization of young children preparing to join 
Young Pioneers) powered by a 25hp American engine and its flight 
characteristics were wonderful. The instructors at the OKB looked very favorably 
on Mikoyan for its low cost (under 12,000 rubles), and that it was foldable for 
storage.^^ Soon after Artyom’s graduation, his aircraft flew a series of four testing 
flights, each better then the last until, when on the fourth flight, the old engine 
gave out and a forced landing was necessary. The damage was minimal, but it was
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the death blow to the students’ small program Arytom moved onto bigger and 
brighter things. Arytom was assigned to Polikarpov fighter OKB in Moscow as a 
VVS inspector.
Mikoyan rapidly advanced through the ranks of the OKB, gaining the trust 
o f designers and engineers alike. Soon he was given his first independent project, 
overcoming heat issues of the 1-153 with regard to gun firing. Within weeks 
Artyom fixed the problem and became a protégé of Polikarpov. It was from this 
position he would emerge when his own OKO was formed in Polikarpovs 
absence. It was also here that he met his future partner, deputy bureau chief 
Mikhail Gurevich.
Mikhail Iosifovich Gurevich was born on January 12, 1893 near Kursk in 
Ukraine.^^ The son of a well-to-do distiller, Mikhail excelled at mathematics from 
a young age. During his time at Kharkov University, young Gurevich became 
involved in student movement of which the czar disapproved and in 1911 Mikhail 
was exiled to France. He continued his studies of aeronautics at L 'Académie 
r Aéronautique in Paris. After graduation and the October Revolution, Gurevich 
returned to Kharkov University where he earned a post-graduate degree. In 1928 
went to work for the TsKB. He was given a position working with Frenchman, 
Paul Richard who was heading a project designing flying boats. The project was 
completed and successful but was never ordered into production, Richard returned 
home to France and Mikhail found work with the TsAGI.
In part because of his command of English Mikhail was asked to 
accompany a delegation visiting the Douglas factories in the US in 1936. The
Gunston, Bill and Gordon, Yefim MiG Aircraft Since 1937 pg 10
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committee was to research and pursue a production license for the DC-3 in the 
USSR, which they eventually accomplished. Upon return to the Soviet Union, 
Gurevich was appointed Deputy Chief of the Polikarpov bureau, then to head a 
new OKB with Mikoyan. The two men already had a blossoming friendship due 
to their mutual ties to Kharkov University and they soon found they worked and 
complimented each other very well. Mikoyan had stated that he would head the 
company “provided Gurevich can be my deputy”.̂  ̂Mikoyan became the energy 
while Gurevich, thirteen years his senior, played the devils’ advocate. On 
December 8, 1939 MiG was bom.
As MiG was a break off o f the Polikarpov bureau, employees were given 
the option of going with the new design team or staying with Polikarpov. Nearly 
40% of Polikarpovs employees went with MiG to refine Project X into a viable 
fighter. Polikarpov, away in Germany during the break-up was understandably 
distraught. On his death bed in 1944, said the events of 1939 hastened his 
downfall.^^
Refinement of the 1-200 (former Project X) was quick. It was the first 
fighter aircraft to exceed 400 mph in level flight, and though it had proved to be a 
quirky aircraft to fly and master, it was rushed into production in early 1940 as the 
MiG-1. The first examples were seen in the annual May Day Parade fly-over in 
Red Square in 1940. The initial version was very quickly updated and renamed 
the MiG-3. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, fully one
Ibid
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third o f VVS fighters were MiG’s, the only non-obsolete aircraft in the Soviet 
inventory.
MiG received an order for the design o f a ground attack aircraft in 1941, 
but the success o f the Ilyushin 11-2 in the early stages of Operation Barbarossa 
convinced Stalin to put all production capacity behind the 11-2 and the order was 
cancelled.^* Throughout the war MiG’s performed decently, although not to their 
fullest capabilities. The early M iG -l’s never reached full scale production and 
frontline numbers were limited. On the other hand, over 3,000 MiG-3 were 
accepted by the VVS.^^ The MiG-3 excelled at high altitude intercepts and once 
this was discovered by the Germans^^, the Luftwaffe engaged the MiG’s at lower 
altitudes where their aircraft held the advantage. Stalin believed aircraft were to 
support ground troops and therefore was keen on the success of the lL-2 
Shturmovik. He halted production of the MiG-3 in the beginning of the 1942 to in 
order to concentrate on Shturmovik production.
The rapid advance of the Wehrmacht into Soviet territory spawned a mass 
migration of Soviet industry eastward. Soviet industry that had not yet succumbed 
or was west of Urals moved east. Part of this mass exodus of man and machine 
was MiG, starting east in August 1941. The move was incredible, set-up to 
produce aircraft until the last possible second GAZ 1, was disassembled and 
rushed eastward to get the lines rolling once again. An airfield, factory and very
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modest facilities were quickly built and by October, the factory was up and 
running. As the Nazi push towards Moscow fizzled, the threat subsided and by 
March of 1942 MiG and GAZ-1 returned to Moscow. The OKB was reorganized, 
the GAZ renumbered 155 and MiGs new home became Leningradskoye Shosse 
(Leningrad Highway). MiG continued producing designs for new fighter aircraft 
throughout the war, but for various reasons, never again won a piston engine 
contract. MiG seemed destined for obscurity, especially in light of the 
conservatism of the Stalinist era. Jet engine design and technology, however, 
would prove the saving grace of MiG.
In late 1944 Stalin issued an order for jet fighter aircraft just as the 
German Me-262 was gaining notoriety. The Allies, in a program headed by Frank 
Whittle, also announced they were flying jet aircraft, albeit not yet in combat. 
This naturally infuriated the General Secretary aftd Soviet OKB’s were pushed to 
catch up. Soviet jet design was nearly non-existent; the only semi-viable option 
was a strange piston powered jet engine that was severely lacking. It was not until 
the end of the war and the capture of German BMW jet engines that design of 
such aircraft became viable. Using information gathered fi-om German scientists 
and designers, MiG created the MiG-9, the first Soviet jet powered fighter, in 
August 1946. An interesting side note that through a flip of a coin, it was also the 
first jet powered Soviet aircraft to take flight.^'^Though its performance was 
average and its maintainability poor (the average life of the engines was only 75 
hours) it launched MiG to the forefront of Soviet OKB’s. A gift far greater then 
this was in store for MiG in the near future.
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A short sighted gift from Great Britain allowed MiG to develop the MiG- 
15. Great Britain sent the Soviets twenty five Rolls-Royce Nene jet engines and 
thirty Derwent je t engines at their request.^^ This gift, coupled with captured 
German data on swept wing design, allowed MiG to create this new aircraft. The 
MiG-15 (NATO codename FAGOT) would soon gain infamy in the skies over 
Korea, and secure MiGs place in the hierarchy of the Soviet defense 
establishment. MiG soon became the premier fighter OKB, quickly 
overshadowing such famous names as Ilyushin, Lavochkin and Tupolev. For the 
next forty years the VVS ordered almost exclusively MiG aircraft to equip its 
fighter regiments.
Arytom Mikoyan reached the rank of General Constructor of the MiG 
design bureau on December 20, 1956. He continued in this capacity even after a 
serious stroke, which in 1969, left his deputy Rostislav Belyakov, as head 
constructor. He died on December 9, 1970. Gurevich outlived his partner but was 
plagued by illness from 1957 onward, retiring in 1964 and passing away in 1976. 
The company continued in their tradition of excellence. Since 1960, more then
20,000 MiG’s have been produced (excluding license built copies), more then any 
other modem aircraft manufacturer.^^ The company later helped design the Bur an 
Space Shuttle in the 1980’s. In the early 1990’s MiG merged with MAPO 
(Moscow Aircraft Production Organization) to become MiG-MAPO and today it 
is simply know as RAC (Russian Air Company) MiG. Importantly RAC MiG was 
granted the right of independent foreign economic activity by President Boris
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Yelstin on January 25, 1996.^^ Today, the company faces financial hardships that 
were never anticipated under the Soviet system. The future of MiG is still 
uncertain.
www.migavia.ni/eng/corporation/?tid=4
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Chapter IV
Synopsis of MiG Aircraft Since 1950^*
MiG enjoyed moderate success during the Great Patriotic War, with the 
MiG-1 and -3 and immediately afterwards with the MiG-9, yet it was the Cold 
War era that would propel MiG into the everyday world lexicon. The MiG-15 was 
the first aircraft from the Mikoyan Gurevich OKB to receive worldwide fame. It 
was designed to complete an order from the MoD for a fighter capable of “up to 
Mach .9 and altitude not less then 11km (36,089ft), with an endurance of at least 
one hour, the ability to operate from unpaved airstrips, heavy big gun armament 
and easy maintenance”^̂ . Work began on the MiG-15 in 1946. Wartime engines 
captured from the Germans were not able to meet the thrust demand, but with the 
acquisition o f Rolls-Royce jet engines from Great Britain work proceeded. A 
reverse engineered version of the Rolls-Royce Nene engine, the RD-45, was 
chosen to power the MiG-15. A radical design for the day, the MiG-15 
incorporated a swept wing design, a design learned from captured German 
scientists and documents. The first flight of the MiG-15 took place in mid-1948, 
around same time as the first flight of the American F-86 Sabre. It was ordered 
into production soon after, with the first rolling of the production line of GAZ 1 in 
December. The VVS accepted the aircraft in early 1950 for fi-ont line service, just
For a flow chart and visual representation o f  each aircraft see appendix 
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as war on the Korean Peninsula erupted. Korea became the proving ground for the 
first generation of swept wing jet fighters.
Stalin, unwilling to become directly involved in the Korean War, instead 
^ave the Chinese a number of M iG-15’s to offset the air superiority of UN forces 
over Korea."̂ ® When the first MiGs appeared over the Yalu River in November of 
1950, the UN forces had nothing to counter. A US Air Force F-80 Shooting Star 
became the first victim of an all jet dogfight, falling to the guns of a Chinese MiG 
on November 8."̂  ̂The US was quick to respond with the deployment of advanced 
F-86 Sabres to Korea. The first MiG to fall to the Sabres was shot down over the 
Yalu in early December. By the end of the conflict, US Sabres had destroyed 
nearly 800 MiG-15’s while losing only 78 F-86’s, ending with a kill ratio of 10 to 
1. This did not mean the MiG was an inferior aircraft, it most certainly was not. It 
enjoyed a better climb and dive rate and was considerably more robust than its 
American counterpart, but the skill of the average MiG pilot was inferior to US 
pilots. When flown by a competent pilot the MiG-15 was deadly as almost 80 
American pilots discovered."^^
Though the MiG-15 did not dominate the skies over Korea, many 
countries chose to equip their air forces with them. Poland, China and 
Czechoslovakia all produced domestic, license-built versions. Overall nearly over
16,000 MiG-15 in numerous variants were built with some still serving as training
Soviet pilots were flying combat missions over Korea albeit in Chinese marked MiG’s. Please 
see Chapter 6.
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aircraft today. Improvement on a design such as this is natural. From the lessons 
learned in the MiG-15 the MiG-17 (NATO codename FRESCO) was designed.
In response to a call from the MoD for an all-weather, radar equipped 
interceptor, MiG began design on the MiG-17. With Soviet jet engine design still 
lagging behind the West MiG decided to improve upon the aerodynamics of the - 
15. The wings were swept back further, reducing the thickness of the wing and the 
tail was re-engineered. The design was a success and entered production in 1953. 
A later variant, the MiG-17F was equipped with a KV-1 afterburning engine 
thereby increasing the Fresco’s speed and power drastically. Production numbers 
eventually reached nearly 11,000 aircraft with license-built versions in nations 
such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and China
The Fresco saw combat in places such as Vietnam, the Sinai Peninsula, 
Africa and the Indian sub-continent and did well. During the Vietnam War, 
American pilots, in far more advanced aircraft, found themselves at disadvantage 
to the small, maneuverable MiG-17. This was especially true due the restrictions 
placed on BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagements for American pilots.
General Robin Olds, one of the top American aces of the war, said “Unlike the 
chair-bome strategists in the Pentagon and their computer analysis, I can say that 
the M iG-17 is a very dangerous little animal. Its maneuverability is phenomenal!
It is very difficult to outmaneuver it with an F-4 Phantom.”^  MiG-17s also served 
in the Indo-Pakistani wars and the Arab-Israeli wars although they did not 
perform as well as they had in Vietnam due to the nature of the combat.
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The Korean War was studied diligently by both the Soviet MoD and the 
OKB’s. The MoD issued a call in 1953 for “a frontal fighter (i.e. not a radar 
equipped interceptor) capable o f Mach 2 in level flight at an altitude of 20km 
(65,617ft) while carrying guns and a radar-ranging s ig h t .L a te r  this requirement 
included integration of a GCI (Ground Control Intercept) network and the ability 
to fire guided missiles. MiG came up with perhaps the most famous Soviet fighter 
design ever, the MiG-21 (NATO codename FISHBED).
Incorporating such features as large delta wings, an afterburning engine 
and the ability to fire K-13 (NATO codename ATOLL) infrared air-to-air 
missiles, the MiG-2 IF was an advanced design. When it entered production in 
late 1959, the MiG-2 IMF was one of the most advanced aircraft in the world. 
Used by more then 40 countries worldwide, it became one o f the most prolific jet 
fighters in the world, numbering more then 14,000 aircraft, many still in service 
today. In combat the MiG-21 was the victor and the vanquished many times over. 
First seeing combat in Vietnam and the Middle East, its record was mixed. In 
Vietnam the MiG-21 did fairly well, downing a number of American aircraft, 
including a B-52. The Arab-Israeli Wars were a different story, with Fishbeds 
suffering greatly at the hands o f the more proficient Israeli pilots. The MiG-21 
also served in the war on the Indian sub-continent, where it did quite well against 
American F-104 Starfighters. This war also was the first in which MiG on MiG 
combat occurred. A Pakistani F-6 (Chinese version of the MiG-19"̂  ̂(NATO
ibid pg 141
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codename FARMER)) destroyed an Indian MiG-21. MiG-2 Ts also participated in 
the Iran-Iraq War, and suffered greatly to the American supplied F-4 Phantoms, 
F-5 Freedom Fighters and F-14 Tomcats."^^ The MiG-21 continues to serve to this 
day having recently participated in the wars of the break-up of Yugoslavia. With 
modifications done to the fire control and avionics by MiG and such companies as 
lAI in Israel, the MiG-21 will continue to serve well into the 21̂ * century.
In the mid-1960s, the need for a fighter-bomber capable of STOL (short 
takeoff and landing) was realized by the VVS. The MoD issued a call for design 
and MiG created the first production variable geometry aircraft in the Soviet 
Union, the MiG-23/27"̂  ̂(NATO codename FLOGGER). The MiG-23 was 
designed at a time when the high speed performance of aircraft was exceeding the 
capabilities o f pilot and structure. Due to the small wing surface of aircraft such 
as the MiG-21 and F-104 Starfighter, landing speeds were becoming intolerably 
high. In addition, the aircraft were not proficient in air-to-ground munitions. They 
could not carry the load required and the speeds at which they operated precluded 
successful engagement of ground targets. MiGs designers, taking the lead of 
American programs such as the F-111 and even captured German documents, 
worked to solve this problem by using a “swing wing” design whereby the 
aircrafts wing surface would extend for low speed-high maneuver operations, and 
sweep to a near delta configuration for high speed-low maneuver situations. The
These aircraft were supplied to the Shah prior to the Islamic Revolution on 1979. Their story is 
fascinating as the Iranians managed to maintain and keep them combat ready despite embargoes. 
Amazingly some are still flying to this day.
The MiG-27 is a further incarnation o f  the MiG-23. Designed to be a tactical support aircraft, it 
was optimized for ground attack with slightly different intakes, advanced nav-attack system and 
the ability to sweep the wings with stores on pylons.
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swing wing also lowered landing and takeoff speeds allowing the MiG-23/27 to 
operate from shorter, unprepared landing strips. The first production MiG-23 
rolled off the production line in mid 1969."̂  ̂The MiG-23 was faster then the 
MiG-21, could cany a heavier, more varied payload and could operate from 
dispersed airfields. The VVS hoped the MiG-23 to be the answer to what was 
needed; a reliable, fast maneuverable, versatile fighter-bomber.
The MiG-23 was a large success as hoped, it was a very complicated 
aircraft to build and maintain. In addition, transition to the aircraft was not as 
smooth other aircraft had been and a two-seat trainer version was hurriedly put 
into production. The MiG-23 was also difficult to maintain. There were structural 
integrity problems with aircraft produced at certain factories. The aircraft was 
exported and license built by many countries with nearly 3,000 examples being 
produced worldwide. Its combat record is also less then stellar. The Flogger saw 
widespread service during the Iran-Iraq War with the Iraqi Air Force, but could 
not operate very effectively over hostile territory and fell prey to the more 
advanced Iranian Air Force. During the Israeli “Peace for Galilee” Operation it 
also saw service with Syria, where it again suffered significantly to Israeli 
aircraft. The MiG-23 was phased out o f service with the VVS in the mid-1980’s 
in favor of the new MiG-29. It remains one of the more disappointing aircraft 
MiG produced. An air show at Domodedovo in July of 1967 was the first showing 
of not only the MiG-23 but its stable mate, the MiG-25 (NATO codename 
FOXBAT).
Belyakov, R.A and Marmain, J. MiG: Fifty Years o f  Secret Designs pg 362 
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During the 1960’s the CIA and the USAF deployed the A -12 and the SR- 
71 reconnaissance platforms, both capable of Mach 3+. The US also developed a 
high speed high altitude bomber capable of Mach 3+. The XB-70 Valkyrie was to 
penetrate Soviet airspace at high altitude and at high speed to deliver its nuclear 
payload. In addition, the US Navy fielded the A-5 Vigilante; a carrier based 
nuclear capable attack aircraft capable of speeds nearing Mach 2.5. The Soviets 
saw the need to counter this threat and the call for a Mach 3+, high altitude 
interceptor with a powerful radar was issued. The MiG-25 was bom out of this 
order. With testing beginning in the mid-I960’,s and the first public showing in 
1967, production of the first Foxbat commenced in 1970. The XB-70, one of the 
aircraft the MiG-25 was designed to counter, never reached production, but SR-71 
Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft were harassing Soviet Air Defenses in the Far 
East on a regular basis. Many of the new MiGs were sent to intercept them, a feat 
they never accomplished. The high speed high altitude capability of the MiG-25 
made it, ironically enough, the perfect reconnaissance aircraft. It was in this form 
that the MiG-25 first found itself in a combat situation.
The Soviets deployed a number of reconnaissance versions of the MiG-25 
to Egypt in 1971 to over-fly and photograph the Sinai Peninsula and Israel itself. 
These MiG-25’s, stationed in Cairo and flown by Soviet pilots, flew with 
impunity over the Israeli air defense network. According to Israeli sources, the 
MiGs were tracked flying at Mach 3.2 and altitudes approaching 72,000ft.^^ It 
was not until 1981 that a MiG-25 was lost to hostile fire; in this case a Syrian
Butowski, Piotr and Miller, Jay OKB MiG: A History o f  the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft pg 
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MiG-25 was ambushed by two Israeli F-15 Eagles. The most notorious case of the 
MiG-25 is that of the defection of Lt. Viktor Belenko to Hokkaido Japan in 1976. 
This answered many questions concerning the Mach 3 interceptor. Air to air 
combat with the MiG-25 occurred during the Iran-Iraq War, with the MiG-25 
scoring a number o f kills, although they suffered heavily to the Iranian F-14’s. Lt. 
Belenko also warned that a new MiG-25 version, optimized for low altitude high 
speed intercepts, was being developed to counter the threat posed by the 
American B-IB. Satellite photographs during the early 1980’s confirmed the 
existence of this aircraft which came to be known as the MiG-31 (NATO 
codename FOXHOUND).
Optimized for high speed, low altitude intercepts, the Foxhound used the 
latest in Soviet LDSD (look down shoot down) radar systems, carried the new 
AA-9 (NATO codename AMOS) long-range missile and was operated by a crew 
of two. The Foxhound was a near total redesign of the MiG-25, with new 
lightweight, efficient Solyukov engines replacing the thirsty Tumansky engines of 
the Foxbat. The fuselage was lengthened to accommodate a WSO (weapons 
system officer) and the airframe was strengthened for a higher g rating. This new 
MiG-31 was photographed for the first time by a Royal Norwegian Air Force F- 
16A off the coast o f Firmmark in 1985.^^ Still posing a threat today, it is in service 
with the Russian and Chinese Air Force.
In 1972, the VVS issued an order for a lightweight fighter to replace the 
MiG-21 and -23. It was to combat such as aircraft as the American F-15, -14, -16, 
French Mirage 2000 and Panavia Tornado, all coming online in the West. It was
Butowski pg 110
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to operate over friendly territory as an interceptor under the close supervision of 
GCI controllers; in addition it was to have limited air-to-ground capabilities using 
precision guided munitions. Out of the VVS order came the MiG-29 (NATO 
codename FULCRUM). The MiG-29 is a single seat, twin engine design bearing 
resemblance to the American F-15, though it is not a copy of it. The first 
production MiG-29 rolled off the assembly line in 1982, at a plant in Moscow. 
Initially deployed to the 16* Air Army in East Germany, all production aircraft 
were earmarked for the VVS. In 1986, the first export versions, with downgraded 
avionics and radars, were delivered to India. Sales followed shortly to Warsaw 
Pact countries and Middle Eastern nations. More then 1500 have been built to 
date, with MiG still producing Fulcrums for the Indian Navy.^^ It is also the only 
Russian-built aircraft to serve in a NATO air force.
Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the MiG-29 demonstrated its 
phenomenal maneuverability during airshows in the West, performing tail slides 
and other previously unheard of maneuvers. Today the MiG-29 is employed the 
world over, with more than 21 nations.^"  ̂However, the MiG-29 has not been 
promising in combat. In Gulf War I the only aircraft it shot down was another 
Iraqi fighter, just prior to it own crash into the ground. In addition, four more 
MiG-29's were downed by American F-15’s during the conflict. Losses also 
occurred during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in which more then five Fulcrums 
were shot down by Ethiopian SU-27’s (NATO codename FLA N K ER ).Tw o
53 http://www.acig.org/
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MiG-29’s of the Yugoslavian Air Force were downed during the NATO bombing 
campaign by American F-15’s. In 2001 two Syrian MiG-29’s were downed by 
Israeli F-15’s.^  ̂Very few victories exist for the MiG-29 in combat/^ The aircraft, 
however is selling, with Malaysia being the latest customer. This aircraft is related 
directly to the future of MiG as a company, as the call for new designs by the 
MoD looks dim. How MiG reacts to the present and future will decide its fate.
ibid
A Cuban MiG-29 did succeed in downing a civilian Cessna 337 in 1996. www.acig.org
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Part II
Case Studies of Four Generations of MiG Aircraft in Combat
Introduction
Fighter aircraft development in the post war era can be divided into 
several distinct generations. The development of post-Second World War jet- 
propelled straight winged aircraft such as the German Me-262, the American P/F- 
80 Shooting Star, the British Gloster Meteor and the Soviet MiG-9 constituted the 
first jet-turbine driven fighter aircraft. These aircraft were not much faster than 
their propeller-driven counterparts and were less maneuverable. Additionally, 
they were considerably more expensive to build and maintain then the fighter of 
World War Two. Although an improvement over previous prop-driven aircraft, jet 
turbine-driven aircraft left much to be desired as viable weapons platforms.
Hence, they are usually not included as a separate generation.
The first generation designated by aviation experts included the first 
aircraft to make use of captured German technologies such as swept wing 
d e s ig n .T h ey  were also the first generation able to break the sound barrier, albeit 
only in a dive. Aircraft in this generation include the American F-86 Sabre, the 
Soviet MiG-15 and the British Hawker Hunter. These aircraft, along with some 
first generation jets, participated in many conflicts such as Korea, the Suez crisis, 
the Indo Pakistani wars and the Six Day War, and numerous other skirmishes.
Aviation Weeks Show News Online September 10, 1998 “On the record with Maj Gen Steffan 
Nastrom C hief o f  Swedish Air Force Material Command” 
http://www.aviationweek.com/shownews/today/newsmkl4.htm
Defining first generation aircraft in manner consistent with international aviation experts dismisses 
aircraft that were developed during the Second World War. Only aircraft developed post-War are 
included such as the M iG -15 and F-86.
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Some of these aircraft are still in service today as training aircraft, ground attack 
aircraft or in reserve roles in many of today’s third world nations.
Second generation aircraft were the first to be able to fly at supersonic 
speeds in level flight. The American F-lOO Super Sabre was the first of these. 
Improvements in avionics, engine and weapons design, along with a shift in 
policy towards bomber interception created missile-carrying aircraft capable of 
engaging and destroying intruding enemy bombers. Aircraft in this generation 
include the American F-4 Phantom and F-105 Thunderchief, the Soviet MiG-19 
and MiG-21 and the British Lightning. These aircraft are still in service with 
many air forces around the world, including NATO and former Warsaw pact 
nations. The proving grounds for these second generation aircraft include, 
Vietnam the Arab-Israeli wars and the Iran-Iraq war. These aircraft are still being 
refitted and improved upon.
The third generation includes most modem front line fighters. These 
include the American F-15 and -16, the Soviet/Russian MiG-23 and -29 and SU- 
27, the European^^ Tornado and the French Mirage. These aircraft are currently in 
the middle of thier service life and most likely will continue to fly well into the 
21®* century. The third generation is typified by fly-by-wire systems^^, advanced 
radar and fire control systems and increased maneuverability. Equipped with 
much more efficient engines, these aircraft are allowed more flight time at higher
The Tornado was built and designed by and international consortium from Britain, Germany 
and Italy.
Fly-by-wire is a system in which pilot input is not direct linked with control surfaces, instead the 
control surfaces are controlled via a computer system. This allows highly unstable aircraft designs 
to be controllable as the computer makes thousands o f  corrections to the flight surfaces a second.
It also allows the computer to evaluate the pilots input and then decide how best to perform the 
maneuver, thus allowing unparalleled maneuverability.
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speeds. Most have also adopted multi-role positions, optimized for air-to-ground 
and air-to-air engagements, often within the same sortie. These aircraft have seen 
conflict in the Middle East during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, both Gulf 
Wars, the skies o f Bosnia/Kosovo and in many other small skirmishes during the 
last twenty years around the world.
The fourth generation of aircraft takes the multi-role aspect even further. 
Among their advantages are digital avionics and fire control, supersonic cruise 
and incredible maneuverability. Militaries around the world hope the flexibility 
offered by these new aircraft engender a one type air force, thus simplifying 
training, maintenance and supply problems. The cockpits of these aircraft will 
also replace all but the most essential gauges with M FD's^\ Although flight 
testing o f fourth generation aircraft is at a very advanced stage, the only nation 
that has fielded such an aircraft in front line service is Sweden, with the SAAB 
Gripen. Expected to enter service in late 2005 the United States is developing the 
F-22 Raptor, while the Eurofighter Typhoon is expected to enter service with the 
countries o f Germany, Italy, Britain and Spain soon. Russia has lagged behind in 
this field, although some argue that the SU-27 Flanker and the aircraft evolving 
from it are truly the first fourth generation aircraft. However, the initial SU-27 
lacked the sophistication of aircraft such as the Raptor, Typhoon or Gripen. Due
M FD’s or Multi-function displays are display screens much like a computer, that with a touch o f  
a button, can control and monitor any number o f  systems within the aircraft such as navigation, 
fire control, engine management or communications. These monitors both save space and provide 
the pilot with much more information at a glance then previous gauged type cockpits. Some later 
third generation aircraft have M FD’s but the fourth generation is the first to have them included at 
the initial design level.
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to fiscal constraints MiG in particular has stalled the development of its fourth 
generation aircraft, the MiG 1.44.
This is the first generation of aircraft in which MiG has not been at the 
forefront of aircraft development. Its designs have played a major role in nearly 
every air-to-air engagement of the post-war era, beginning with Korea and 
continuing to this day in places such as the Middle East, the Balkans and Asia. A 
short history and evaluation of MiG aircraft within each generation from Korea to 
present day, including lessons learned from previous conflicts, is the key to 
understanding the design bureau and its designs.
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Chapter V
The Korean War
The MiG-15 and the First Generation of Soviet Jet-Powered Fighters
When North Korea careened across the 38̂ *’ parallel on June 25* 1950, 
there was little in the way of airpower to stop them. South Korea possessed no 
armed aircraft and very few transports. Most of these were caught by surprise and 
destroyed on the ground in the early hours of the invasion. At the outbreak of 
hostilities the North Koreans had mostly surplus World War Two Soviet aircraft 
such as Yak-9's and Il-lO’s. Although obsolete, they were extremely effective as 
they were no counter threats. The North Korean Air Force reigned supreme over 
the skies of Korea for a short time, until the US Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) 
began to launch sortie against them fi-om both Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
FEAF wrested control of the air from the North Korean Air Force (NKAF) 
Very quickly. American F-82 Twin Mustangs and early jet aircraft such as the F- 
80 Shooting Star, decimated the poorly trained and equipped NKAF. By the time 
of the Inchon landing in September of 1950, the NKAF has nearly ceased to exist. 
The UN now dominated the skies and pounded relentlessly the beleaguered North 
Korean soldiers trapped between Seoul and Pusan. A rapid retreat ensued and by 
October UN forces had crossed the 38* parallel into North Korea. Air operations 
during this time were in tactical direct support of ground forces, strafing and 
bombing enemy locations, and strategic bombing of North Korea by B-29’s 
operated fi-om Japan. Little air opposition was met by either. The B-29 raids
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became known as “milk runs” by the aircrews as not even enemy
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anti-air artillery was encountered. Without outside help the NKAF was in no 
position to defend its airspace from the UN forces. Mistakes made by American 
pilots and planners, however may have served to reinforce plans in Beijing and 
Moscow to intervene in the war.
On September 22, a flight of US B-29 Superfortresses accidentally 
bombed the rail marshalling yard at Antung, north of the Yalu River and inside of 
China. After making a navigational error on October 8, four US F-80 Shooting 
Stars attacked a Soviet airfield near Vladivostok.^^ Some speculate these errors 
may have convinced China and the USSR that UN forces had intentions extending 
outside the boundaries o f North Korea. These two actions may have been the 
catalyst for the Soviets to deploy MiG-15’s (NATO codename FAGOT) and 
pilots to China to counter the dominate UN air forces. The USSR also began 
training Chinese and North Korean pilots to fly the MiG-15.
On November 1 1950, six previously unidentified swept wing jet fighters 
made a firing pass on a flight of US F-51 Mustangs.^"^ The swept wing fighters 
came in from north o f the Yalu and fled back across after the unsuccessful attack. 
The US fighters were unable to pursue as anything north of the Yalu was, and 
would continue to be throughout the war, off-limits. Even when the commander 
o f the 25^ FS/51®  ̂FW, Lieutenant Colonel Clure Smith, flying an F-80C, brought 
back gun camera footage clearly showing a MiG-15 he had engaged, the 
intelligence and command communities did little to counter the threat. However,
Knez, Saso and Joe Brenan. “Honchos” Air Combat Information Group Journal. October 2003 
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article 315 .shtml
^  Dorr, Robert, Lake, Jon and Thompson, Warren Korean War Aces (Osprey. London, 1995) 
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on November 8 the first jet-vs-jet aerial victory occurred. Lieutenant Russell 
Brown was credited with downing a MiG-15, though the Soviets disputed this fact 
and claimed an F-80 was d o w n ed .T h e  first MiG kill confirmed by the Soviets 
occurred the next day when Lieutenant Commander William Amen of VF-111 
scored one o f the few Navy kills in his F9F Panther. Very quickly, the MiG-15 
proved its worth over the skies of Korea, proving far superior to anything in the 
UN inventory. Able to out-turn and out-climb all jet fighters in the theatre, the 
MiG-15 was faster then all prop driven aircraft and could attack with near 
impunity the now vulnerable B-29 Superfortresses. It soon began to wrestle 
control back from the UN forces.
MiG-15 Development: The Soviet Union Enters the Jet Age
Soviet designers in the immediate post-war era faced a huge dilemma. 
Stalin had ordered the development of an aircraft that drastically exceeded the 
performance of early straight-winged MiG-9. The design called for the aircraft to 
be effectively airborne for over an hour, able to operate at high transonic speeds
Dorr pg 16 This kill is highly debated, as the Soviets (the only nation with MiG-15s flying in 
Korea at the time) does not acknowledge losing any aircraft that day. In fact the kill ratio 
traditionally accepted by UN sources is n o w , with access to Soviet archives, highly suspicious. 
Both sides claim far more kills then the other admits to losing. For example the US claim o f  a 15:1 
kill ratio is not corroborated by Soviet, Korean and Chinese sources. Soviets claim nearly a 1:1 
ratio. Causes o f  this are multiple but include the problem that the airspace where MiG-UN  
engagements occurred over Communist controlled territory; therefore wreckage o f  claims could 
not be found. Also many engagements ended with a MiG spinning and apparently out o f control, 
yet out o f  sight the aircraft recovered and returned to its bases north o f the Yalu. The issue o f kill 
ratios will unlikely ever be resolved and for the purpose o f  this work not be used as a measure of  
aircraft success.
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and able to achieve altitudes of over 40,000 feet.^^ This criterion presented 
difficult problems for Soviet designers. First, domestic jet engine development 
was no where near the level needed for the speeds required. Soviet designs had a 
very poor service record most engines needed full rebuilds after only 25 hours of 
operation. Another hurdle was the fact that at speeds over 500mph, straight 
winged aircraft experienced stability problems, due to fluctuations in airflow over 
control surfaces. The result o f exceeding this speed (called critical Mach number) 
would often result in uncontrollable fluttering of the tail and wings, often 
separating these from the aircraft. Swept wing aircraft could raise the critical 
Mach number to a much higher level, but Soviet designers possessed little 
knowledge of this design. Extensive research had been done by the German 
Luftwaffe during the Second World War, but the nature of advancing Soviet 
troops convinced nearly all research engineers and pilots to flee westward towards 
US and British lines to surrender. Thus, the Soviet Air force did gather a wealth 
of data and material such as airfi-ames and importantly Jumo engines as they 
advanced, but they did not capture many Luftwaffe test pilots or researchers. The 
US had an edge after the war, with its vast knowledge of Luftwaffe experiments 
both through captured pilots and aircraft designers. As Luftwaffe Lieutenant 
General Adolf Galland told his US intelligence officer during his debriefing, "I 
am of the opinion that Germany has lost the war but the future of eill Europe lies
^  Butowski pg 59
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in the hands o f the allies (i.e. US and Britain). I have no place to go and no desire 
to go anywhere. I will be at your wishes at all times.”^̂
The Soviets captured few pilots and engineers. Unfortunately for the VVS, 
the few who were captured were tried for bogus war crimes such as killing 
civilians with stray machine gun rounds. Once sentenced to hard labor in Siberia, 
these pilots and engineers were o f little use to the VVS. This would later harm the 
tactical evolution o f the VVS as the Americans learned much from their captured 
Luftwaffe personnel concerning new tactics being perfected towards the end of 
the war. The VVS did benefit from captured Luftwaffe documents. It began to 
incorporate these designs, along with captured German engines into its first post­
war jet aircraft.
After experimentation with the swept wing designs, the MiG OKB used 
both indigenous and captured Luftwaffe documentation, to develop an airframe 
capable of exceeding the performance of the MiG-9 FARGO. Two areas of 
airframe design allowed MiG to advance past the MiG-9. First, engine placement 
was changed from the nose of the aircraft (called the Redan design) to the rear of 
the aircraft. This allowed more room in the forward fuselage, allowed placement 
of the wings further forward and put the exhaust of the jet engine at the complete 
rear o f the aircraft, improving aerodynamics. Of equal importance was the 
creation of the swept wing. This wing design, now swept at an angle back from
Knez, http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_315.shtml
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the fuselage, allowed both a higher speed and better economy and stability.
These two designs formed the basis of the MiG-15 (NATO codename FAGOT).
Airframe now ready, the Soviets still lacked a sufficient engine to propel 
the new fighter to speeds of which it was aerodynamically capable. This problem 
was overcome in a most unusual manner. In fall o f 1946, Arytom Mikoyan and 
his deputy ,Mikhail Gurevich, were invited by the British government to visit the 
Rolls-Royce jet engine plant as part of a trade agreement. This seemed too good 
to be true at the time; the British possessed the world’s finest turbojet engines. 
During the visit, Mikoyan acquired twenty five complete Rolls-Royce Nene 
engines as well as rights to manufacture, over a game of snooker. One of the 
greatest windfalls for Soviet aviation was won by pool hall skill. Additionally, 
during the visit one of the Soviet delegates wearing very soft soled boots, stamped 
around the milling machines that made the turbine blades and was able to secure 
small pieces to analyze in Moscow. This helped the Soviets overcome a major 
hurdle in je t engine production, mainly what materials would allow a turbine 
blade to be able to withstand the extreme pressures and force encountered within 
a turbine. Having discovered this composition, the Soviets manufactured the alloy 
prior to the arrival of the British engines at the Klimov design bureau. Coupled 
with its new airframe, the newly designated RD-45 engine allowed performance 
pleasantly beyond Stalin’s expectations.
Flight testing of the 1-310, (as the prototype MiG-15 was called) 
commenced at the end of December, 1947. The was quite a the surprise to MiG
Gordon, Yefim, and Vladimir Rigmant. M iG -15: Design. Development, and Korean War 
Combat History. (Motorbooks International. Osceola, Wl. 1993). pg 8 
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and the TsKB. Test pilot Yuganov was selected to carry out the first flight, to take 
place in early January of 1949. At the time, Soviet test pilots were given ten 
thousand rubles as a bonus for first flights. Being short on money, Yuganov 
decided the first flight must take place before the New Year. Though his requests 
were denied, Yuganov took off during a high speed taxi trial on December 30̂ *̂ ’ 
retracted the landing gear and flew two circles around the airfield. Thus the first 
flight of a MiG-15 was unauthorized.^^
At the same time that the MiG-15 was being designed and tested a similar 
fighter, the La-15 was being tested by rival OKB, Lavockhin. Despite its 
acceptance into service for the VVS by Marshal Veshinin, the MiG-15 was 
ordered to fly against the La-15 in a series of tests to determine which design was 
superior. Pilots decided upon the MiG-15 for a number of reasons. It boasted ease 
of maintenance, simpler manufacture, superior handling and take-off behavior, 
better armament, greater range, superior rate of climb and last but not least, better 
reliability.^^ Despite these the La-15 possessed a higher top speed and more 
stability at the transonic speed envelope. No clear Avinner was decided and both 
designs were ordered into production.E xactly  one year after Yungaov’s first 
unauthorized flight, he flew the first production MiG-15.
As with any new aircraft, the MiG-15 was not without problems. Foremost 
it had an unsettling habit of becoming unrecoverable during a spin. This 
phenomenon was never rectified, instead pilots were instructed to avoid spins at
Gordon pg 17 
Butowski pg 62
The La-15 was a failure within the VVS with only 500 being made. It was withdrawn from 
service in the early 1950’s in favor o f  the MiG-15.
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all costs and an automatic airbrake at Mach .88 was incorporated. A weakness in 
the materials used to make the tail was also discovered. During high speed dive 
recoveries and combat maneuvers a small percent would deform leading to 
occasional separation, better quality materials being retrofitted to all MiG-15’s 
fixed this problem. Most importantly was the continuing redesign of the RD-45 
powerplant.
Sketch of MiG-1574
The RD-45 did not live up to the expectations of the VVS, though based 
on a good design, the Rolls-Royce Nene. It gulped fuel at an excessive rate, had a 
poorer than expected thrust output and a higher than expected maintenance 
schedule. Klimov, the manufacturer o f the RD-45, designed a new engine, the 
VK-1. This produced twenty percent more power, had significantly lower fuel 
consumption and required less time between engine overhauls. These 
improvements were incorporated into the MiG-15bis, an upgraded version of the
http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/AC/aircraft/MIG-l 5/m igl 5_m fo/niigl 5_info.htm
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original. The MiG-15bis version would see the most use over the cold skies of the 
Korean peninsula.
Duels at LOOP MPH: The Jet Comes of Age 
Korea
The air war in Korea began as the Second World War ended, with prop- 
driven surplus aircraft used by both sides. In three short years the conflict ushered 
in an era of aerial combat shaped aerial warfare for the next twenty years. The 
MiG-15 raised alarm bells inside Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) command when it 
was reported. The aircraft was vastly superior to anything fielded by the UN 
forces in Korea at the time. More importantly the MiG-15 could disrupt with 
impunity, the B-29 Superfortress bomber streams attacking tactical and strategic 
targets within North Korea. The balance in the air began to swing towards the 
Communist side for the first time in the war.
When the first MiG-15’s were sighted by American F-51 Mustang pilots 
in November 1950, there was no North Korean or Chinese air force to speak of. 
China had relied upon Soviet pilots and aircraft for air defense since the signing 
of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty in February of 1950.^^ Soviet MiG-15 pilots 
claimed kills against Kuomintang aircraft in April of that year and may have been 
in Shanghai for quite some time p rev io u s .T h e  Soviet Unions involvement in the
Zhang, Xiamong. “China and the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953” The Journal o f Military History 
Vol 62, No.2 (April, 1998) pg 344
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Korean War, though widely speculated during the war, has become public 
knowledge since the fall of the Soviet Communism and the opening of Soviet 
archives. It was Soviet pilots that gave the American and UN forces the greatest 
challenge earning them the respectful name “Honcho’s”, by allied pilots. This is 
not to say that North Korean and Chinese pilots were not skilled, but the vast 
majority were ill prepared for the high speed aerial fighting that occurred over the 
Yalu River. Yevgeni Pepelyeav, a former Soviet MiG-15 pilot is quoted, “If it 
was a hard fight for the us, then what about the Chinese? Our Chinese allies were 
inadequately trained for combat and suffered heavy losses. They were actually 
aerial targets for the A m e r ic a n s .T h e  Chinese and North Korean pilots also 
suffered heavily due to the lack of an anti-g suit^* coupled with a poor diet and 
health. Many simply passed out during high G maneuvers or avoided them all 
together. Indeed, it was the Soviet pilots who flew the MiG-15 to its greatest 
potential.
Although it was flying fighter aircraft in Korea, the Soviet Union was 
unwilling to publicly admit its involvement, Stalin was concerned that it could 
lead to a broadening of the war and could very quickly introduce nuclear weapons 
to the conflict. Due to Stalin’s reluctance to further Soviet involvement 
restrictions were imposed on Soviet pilots. All pilots were ostensibly volunteers, 
though in truth entire units were rotated through. Pilots wore Chinese umforms 
and were instructed to only speak Chinese over the radio despite the fact they
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inflates and deflates to keep blood from rushing to or from the brain and causing loss o f  
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knew were not fluent. Not surprisingly, Russian pilots speaking Chinese lasted 
only until first contact. Soviet pilots were tasked with the protection of the Yalu 
River Valley from bomber raids. Their primary mission was interception of B- 
29’s, not tangling with American fighter aircraft. As the Americans were eager to 
get a hold of a MiG-15 to study, all MiG pilots were forbidden to fly over the sea 
for fear of being shot down and the aircraft recovered. Soviet pilots were 
restricted to flying over friendly territory. The capture of a Soviet pilot by the UN 
would have been a publicity coup. Thus, most operations were limited to the area 
known as MiG Alley, the target of most B-29 raids. Soviet pilots were not to 
engage in offensive operations in the theater, thus Soviet MiG-15’s did not carry 
bombs, napalm or rockets with which to attack UN ground fo rces .S ta lin  hoped 
that by keeping his posture defensive, a broader war could be avoided.
Early Soviet MiG-15 in Korea*^
Responding to the threat posed by the MiG-15, the USAF introduced the 
F-86A Sabre to the Peninsula. On December 17^, 1950 the first patrol by Sabres
Gordon pg 139
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was flown over MiG Alley. Soviet pilots (thought to be Chinese) intercepted the 
flight and in the ensuing battle Lt Col. Bruce Hinton became the first F-86 pilot to 
down a MiG. The duels for the next three years that ensued between the Sabres 
and MiG’s over the Yalu River would become legend, in part due to the similar 
design nature of the aircraft involved.
The F-86 was a very similar aircraft to the MiG-15; in fact both were 
based upon captured Luftwaffe research. The wing design on the F-86 had come 
directly from captured Me-262’s. Both aircraft were similar sized and performed 
comparably, however there were design elements that affected the manner in 
which both types of aircraft were flown in combat.
The M iG-15, with the RD-45 engine, could operate at altitudes up to 
50,000ft. This was nearly 10,000ft higher than the original F-86A. It also climbed 
much faster, had a better thrust to weight ratio and was more maneuverable at 
higher attitudes then the Sabre. The Sabre gained speed in a dive faster than the 
MiG-15 and was more maneuverable at lower both lower altitudes and higher 
speeds. Importantly the armament also differed. The MiG-15 featured two NR-23 
23mm cannons and a single N-37 37mm cannon, while the F-86 had six rapidly 
firing .50 caliber machine guns. Both set of guns presented problems for the 
respective pilots. The MiG’s cannons, designed to destroy bombers, were very 
lethal but fired slowly making deflection shooting difficult. The weight of the 
round also made long range shooting more of an art then a skill, as the drop 
incurred on these massive rounds was immense. Despite these problems, if a 
MiG-15 pilot scored hits on an F-86, the aircraft would most likely be destroyed.
Dorrpg 18
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The six Browning .50 caliber machine guns fitted on the Sabre were 
accurate to a much greater range, but suffered because of their small size. During 
the first engagement of MiG’s and Sabres, Lt Col Bruce Hinton fired more then 
1802 rounds at the MiG before it was killed. As Evgeny Pepalyeav states, “The 
American .50cal guns acted like peas on our MiG-15’s. Our aircraft would return 
to the airfields with 40 to 50 bullet holes. The Americans would claim them as 
killed, while pilots landed them safe and sound. The MiG-15 was more survivable 
then the Sabre; our pilot was protected from astern and the VK-1 and RD-45 
engine itself was more survivable then the J47 found on the Sabre”^̂  The F-86 
also had a much better radar-ranging, lead-computing sight than the MiG-15, and
according to MiG pilots, theirs was not even used in the computing mode. 83
North American 
F-8BE Sabre
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Three Dimensional sketch of F-86E
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Later versions o f the Sabre, the -E  and -F  models, had an improved 
engine that decreased the MiG advantage o f ceiling and rate of climb, but the 
upgraded MiG-15bis suffered the same problems as the MiG-15 during dives and 
at lower altitudes. Later models of the Sabre had a different wing design and 
powered flight controls, both increasing maneuverability while decreasing pilot 
fatigue.^^ Interestingly, neither side addressed shortcomings dealing with 
armament during the war.
Soviet Tactics. Successes and Problems
Tactics have traditionally evolved out of ones strength while exploiting the 
enemy’s weaknesses. Soviet pilots in Korea displayed this and used the 
advantages o f their MiG-15’s to their greatest potential. The MiG-15, especially 
against the earlier F-86 Sabres, held a distinct advantage in both rate of climb and 
operational ceiling. The F-86 could dive faster and was more maneuverable then 
the MiG at lower altitudes. Thus, as Major General Sergey Kramarenko, 
commander o f the 176* FAR, commented, ‘‘The F-86 and the MiG-15 rarely went 
into protracted fighting. The fight, as a rule, was decided in the first attack. It did 
not matter whether it was successful, after the first attack, MiG-15’s reached for 
altitude, while Sabres raced for the ground. Each tried to get to the altitude where 
it held the distinct advantage and thus the air battle, scarcely having begun, faded
Fleck, Michael USAF Lt. Col. “Continuities in Four Disparate Air Battles” MA Thesis, Air 
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at once.”^̂  The battle often turned into a game of baiting, each side trying to lure 
the other to the altitude that offered the greatest chance of downing the enemy.
Soviet tactics reflected this doctrine. MiG’s usually operated in a six 
aircraft flight, loitering near the target they were to protect. There were usually 
three flights o f six aircraft called, respectively, “attack, cover and reserve”.*’ The 
attack flight’s main goal was disrupting of the bombers or fighter bombers from 
hitting the target; they left the escorting fighter aircraft to be dealt with by the 
cover flight.** The reserve flight was to assist either flight if the need arose and 
was not to engage unless needed.
During the entire course of a sortie, MiG’s were controlled by GCI 
(Ground Control Intercept) officers who manned radar stations inside of China. 
MiG’s usually remained on the ground until GCI stations detected an incoming 
threat; they then scrambled the MiG’s into the air and vectored them into the 
target area. The system varied little from the proven system developed by the 
Soviets during the Great Patriotic War.
After being vectored into position by the GCI, Soviet pilots would initiate 
a head-on approach to the target, usually as high above the target as possible. 
When the MiG flight was in proper range, they would divide up into three pairs 
and dive on the target. The first pair would attempt to break up and scatter the 
bombers, while the subsequent two pair would attack the most vulnerable targets 
after they fled. As soon they finished attacking a target, the MiG’s would use their
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today, protecting a flight o f  fighter-bombers or interception aircraft.
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superior climb rate to zoom back to a perch greater than the escorting fighter 
could reach. Then the original tactic was repeated. This tactic made it very hard 
for the escorting Sabres to engage the MiG’s. They did not posses the thrust to 
reach the altitudes from which the MiG’s began and by the time the MiG’s came 
screaming toward the bombers, they were going much faster then the Sabres.
Another variation of this tactic was called “hump the sun”. In this 
variation, MiG pilots would dive out o f the sun towards a target, perform a half 
roll whilst attacking and egress back upwards towards the sun. This tactic allowed 
the MiG not only to escape to a higher altitude but also to escape visual detection 
at the beginning and end of its dive.
Using these tactics, Soviet pilots fought very well against their UN 
counterparts. They scored a claimed 1,300 aircraft downed while losing 345 MiG- 
15’s.*  ̂Though these numbers do not match claims made by the Americans, they 
nonetheless show that Soviet pilots were skilled. Nevertheless, Soviet pilots had 
their fair share of problems.
Soviet squadrons were rotated through Korea as a whole unit. In contrast, 
the Americans rotated pilots through individually. This enabled new American 
pilots to learn about combat firsthand from pilots who had been in-country for 
some time. This resulted in a lower loss rate for new American pilots. Incoming 
Soviet pilots, on the other hand, could learn only by word-of-mouth from 
experienced pilots. Even this was difficult, as the Soviet leadership was unwilling 
to admit even to members of its own military, that Soviet pilots were flying in
As mentioned previously, claims made by either side, both likely inflated, are not the focus o f  
this work, but do show the skill o f  both sides.
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Korea. Consequently, Soviet pilots “stepped on the same rake” as their 
predecessors, making the learning curve very steep. After each rotation American 
pilots were facing rookie Soviets. This disservice done by Soviet high command 
to its pilots is best illustrated with the example of the 97* lAD, who rotated into 
Antung in early 1952. Within four months of their arrival in Korea, the squadron 
was nearly decimated. This prompted calls from Soviet field commanders for 
better training or a pilot-based rotation. Nothing was ever done. It was far easier 
for a huge military like the Soviet Union to rotate whole units rather then single 
pilots.^^ Lt General Lobov, head of the 64* lAK (Fighter Air Corp) in Korea 
expressed his dismay.
People were replaced in the 64* LAK by relieving an entire 
division at a time. Arriving replacements had only a vague idea of combat 
tactics. This caused newly arrived units to lose many rookie pilots.
Besides, participation by the VVS in the war was secret and was 
concealed from our own citizens. Experience gained at the expense of our 
pilots lives was studied by the VVS and PVO officers, but was kept 
strictly confidential
In addition, in many air units, flight safety, rather then combat 
training, enjoyed high priority. Air commanders of all ranks were forced 
to simplify training. For example, training flights were made in close 
combat formations, and, as a rule, with external tanks that limited 
maneuverability. Mock air battles during training were waged against 
targets that were not maneuvering or mounting any opposition. We 
addressed higher authorities’ criticizing this faulty system of training and 
replacing pilots. But all remained as it was. It was simpler to move entire 
divisions with a stroke of a pen, rather then to train every regiment, every 
pilot, for coming battles.
Despite the highly centralized Soviet military model, the Soviet Union 
declined to coordinate with either the Chinese or the North Koreans air forces, 
regardless of the fact the two former countries maintained a joint air command
Zhang, Xiamong Red Wings Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea. 
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infrastructure. For political cooperation never materialized reasons, though 
pushed for by Soviet field commanders. Stalin believed this would expose the 
Soviet Union’s participation in the conflict.^^ This lack of cooperation created 
problems on a number of occasions, such as Chinese or North Korean anti-aircraft 
artillery firing on Soviet MiG’s or Soviet MiG’s firing upon Chinese or North 
Korean aircraft. Many Soviet leaders believe this lack of cooperation, coupled 
with Stalin’s reluctance to participate in offensive air operations, the reason for 
the dismal performance by their Communist allies.
Soviet pilots operated from Chinese bases just across the Yalu River from 
North Korea, this in part to keep them safe from American bombers who were not 
to cross the river. American accounts say this gave the Soviets an advantage in 
combat. Communist pilots, they claim, could climb to high altitude withins China 
and make diving firing passes on American aircraft across the border, and then 
execute a climb to the north back to their sanctuary. Conversely, Soviet pilots 
believed American pilots to hold the advantage. “When they [Americans] found 
themselves at a disadvantage, they quickly went toward the sea and from there, 
after choosing a convenient moment and taking advantageous position they could 
engage without hindrance. Our adversary was restricted by the Chinese border. In 
spite of this, our pilots went deep into the south, and the Americans crossed the 
Yalu, attacking our aircraft during takeoff and landings.”^̂  Some historians have
Zhang 141 
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claimed that this attacking of Soviet MiG’s on take off and landings “puts the 
Soviet-American kill ratio in air to air combat in a somewhat different light” "̂*
The MiG-15 was by most reports, roughly the equal of the F-86. It was 
clearly superior to aircraft such as the Australian Meteor or the straight winged F- 
80’s of the USAF. Designed along the same lines, it was usually the better pilot 
who prevailed in combat between the M iG-15 and the F-86. Each had distinct 
advantages that their respective pilots attempted to exploit, while the other 
attempted to take advantage of their foes weakness. Korea was perhaps the last 
true traditional dog fighting war.
Soviet participation in the Korean War, exclusively flying the MiG-15, 
was impressive. Though kill claims are highly disputed, the Soviets do admit 
losing 345 MiG’s to all causes, while USAF records show 971 total aircraft lost, 
with 103 F-86’s being lost in aerial com bat.T ak ing  into account the inflation of 
kills and reduction o f aerial losses, Soviet and American pilots were well matched 
in both skill and technology. Most pilots on both sides were veterans of the 
Second World War, some Soviet pilots scoring over 60 kills against the Germans. 
Clearly skill, not technology was the deciding factor in these first aerial battles of 
the jet age. This was also perhaps the last war in which jet propelled aircraft 
would duel with guns against each other in a traditional sense. After Korea, 
development o f air-to-air missiles would forever change the nature of aerial 
warfare.
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Chapter VI
The MiG-21 and the Air War in Southeast Asia
When, in retaliation for the Gulf o f Tonkin incident, American Navy and 
Air Force aircraft began flying strikes against North Vietnam, it was noted that up 
to thirty Chinese supplied MiG-17’ŝ  ̂(NATO codename Fresco) were parked at 
airfields throughout North Vietnam. American pilots were warned to be on the 
look out for the small MiG’s. On April 4**̂, 1965, US pilots were attacked for the 
first time by North Vietnamese MiG-17’s with inconclusive results. Each side 
claims to have shot the other down, but American pilots are credited with three 
kills that day.^^ The first undisputed kill of the conflict came nearly two months 
later when USN F-4B Phantom from VF-21 destroyed a MiG-17 with an AIM-7.
North Vietnamese MiG pilots became increasingly aggressive during the 
ensuing months. Using their small nimble MiG-17’s the North Vietnamese pilots 
turned inside of the larger American aircraft and then attacked them with cannon 
fire. During the summer of 1965 no less then five North Vietnamese MiG’s were 
downed by American fighters. However, the Vietnamese also succeeded in 
shooting down at least one American fighter during the summer of 1965 and 
another in November of the same year. These losses were too high for the North
The M iG -17 is a small aircraft resembling the M iG -15, o f  which it was a further refinement. It 
has a more powerful engine, a larger, more swept tail and larger more swept wings. It was not 
capable o f  supersonic flight, nor did it carry air-to-air missiles.
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Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF); and the MiG pilots entered a training period, 
making mock attacks on strike packages before escaping into sanctuary zones. It 
was not until the spring of 1966 that the VNAF began to aggressively target 
American aircraft a^ain. Also in the spring o f 1966, the VNAF received their first 
MiG-21 (NATO codename FISHBED) interceptors from China and the Soviet 
Union. Though initially they experienced high losses, the MiG-21 would be the 
plane o f choice for thirteen of the VNAF sixteen aces. One pilot, Nguyen Van 
Coc, would be credited with at least nine kills, perhaps more, until his death in 
1 9 7 2  98 MiG-21, in the hands of the few experienced Vietnamese pilots, was
a formidable threat for American aircrews over North Vietnam.
The air war over North Vietnam provided both belligerents, American and 
Communist, a laboratory in which to test new weapons of the Cold War. It was 
the first time American pilots were threatened with surface to air missiles, missile 
equipped interceptors and a highly developed modem air defense network. It was 
the first use o f US missile equipped fighters, B-52 Stratofortresses, precision 
guided weapons and high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Each country used the 
on and off nature of the war over Vietnam to learn lessons, analyze them, and 
quickly devise a new tactic.
The Americans, in particular, struggled with the MiG threat. During the 
early years of the war the kill ratio was 2:1 in favor of the Americans, a long cry 
from the claimed 10:1 in Korea. By effectively using down time offered by the 
peace negotiations, the US Navy raised this ratio to 8:1 by 1972. This was in large
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part due to its intense, hands-on study o f the MiG’s capability. In large part, the 
low kill rate was due to US air power tacticians miscalculating the evolving 
nature o f aerial warfare. American pilots were no longer proficient in ACM (Air 
Combat Maneuvering) i.e. dogfighting. Instead they relied on weapons ill-suited 
to the conflict over North Vietnam. In contrast, the North Vietnamese had the 
appropriate weapons; they struggled with training and deploying effective pilots 
in a war zone. Both sides would struggle throughout the war to achieve victory in 
the air, and while the final outcome can be debated, both sides were valiant in 
attaining their goals.
Later to serve in air forces the world over the MiG-21, gained its initial 
combat experience over the jungles o f North Vietnam. It performed admirably in 
the face of overwhelming American numerical and qualitative superiority. While 
suffering heavily under the guns o f the Americans, MiG-21 ’s are credited with a 
minimum of 45 kills.^^ The development and design of the MiG-21 is a key aspect 
in understanding the successes and drawbacks of the aircraft in the war over 
North Vietnam.
MiG Enters Mach Two
Aviation grew in leaps and bounds in the twenty years preceding the late 
1950’s. Soviet military theorists as well as aircraft designers learned much about 
the correct implementation of airpower from the conflict in Korea. However, the
^  American eind Vietnamese kill claims do not come close to matching and, as stated before, for 
the purpose o f  this work will only be used sparingly. If one is to believe Vietnamese claims, over 
120 American aircraft were downed by M iG -21 ’s. MiG-21 units pg 89-90
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Soviet Union was not as technologically advanced as the West which was 
beginning to plan fighters and bombers beyond the capabilities of the Soviets. In 
particular, the American development and deployment of the B-47 Stratojet put 
fear into the Soviet military. The B-47, capable of flying around the world, could 
cruise at Mach 0.9 rendering the M iG-15, its close cousin the MiG-17 (NATO 
codename FRESCO), and the newly developed MiG-19 (NATO codename 
FARMER) all but o b s o l e t e . E v e n  more worrisome was the nearly complete B- 
52 Stratofortress. I f  s cruising altitude would preclude any defense the Soviets 
could mount. This, coupled with the growing nuclear tensions between the newly 
formed NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, led the Soviet Air Force and the 
TsAGI (Central Air and Hydrodynamics Research Institute, assigned to work with 
MiG on the project) to scramble for a new fighter.
The M iG-15 proved to be a formidable opponent from experience from 
Korea, especially in the hands of an experienced pilot. It also proved that tactical 
air warfare could still be fought in a close-in battle of maneuver. Turning, 
acceleration, rate of climb and situational awareness were still assets to be valued. 
On top of this, the new threat from American intercontinental bombers had to be 
addressed. Therefore, in March o f 1953, an order was put forth by the Ministry 
for Aircraft Production (MAP) for an aircraft capable of reaching speeds in excess 
o f 2,000km/h and at altitudes of 20,000 meters while carrying range-only radar, 
air-to-air missiles and heavy cannons. As if this was not difficult, the aircraft 
had to be small, lightweight, have conventional flying characteristics, be
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maneuverable and operate from unprepared surfaces. This created a large problem 
for MiG and the TsAGI. Primarily, no engine yet existed in the Soviet Union that 
could propel an aircraft to such speeds. The small size of the aircraft was also a 
problem as it restricted both the size of engine and fuel capacity. MiG had just 
finished designing the MiG-19, an aircraft meant to intercept high flying bombers. 
However, at the conclusion of the design and acceptance by the VVS, the MiG-19 
was deemed only a marginal success. It had become too heavy to fly fast and be 
an effective dogfighting p l a t f o r m . I t  was also far too complex for the conscript 
mechanics to maintain.
Design o f the airframe came first, after which an appropriate sized engine 
was to be developed. It was during the late 1950’s that the TsAGI reached the 
height o f its influence and, as a result, much of the research to design the airframe 
was done in conjunction with MiG and TsAGI. During high speed wind tunnel 
tests, the Institute had discovered two approaches to high speed wing platforms. 
First, the traditional MiG swept back wing, similar to the wings found on the 
MiG-15, -17, and -19. If swept to the appropriate angle, the wing would provide 
stability needed to operate in the subsonic, transonic and supersonic regions. The 
benefits of this design included ease of manufacture and decreased research effort. 
Another design explored by MiG and TsAGI was the delta wing.
Delta wing research within the Soviet Union was virtually nonexistent. 
During the late 1930’s, some of research was conducted, but dealt with slow, 
prop-driven aircraft. Luftwaffe research documents captured at the end of the war 
had led the TsAGI to test the feasibility o f the design. It was not known if the
Butowski pg 81
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wing would offer enough stability at supersonic speeds yet offered little drag. The 
delta wing was shown to be much more agile than the swept wing. The TsAGI 
proved it to be stable in the trans-and -supersonic region, but it suffered from high 
landing and fast takeoff speed and bad stall characteristics. Research soon proved 
the addition of conventional horizontal tail surfaces remedied these problems 
without adverse effects. While not a true delta wing design (it had conventional 
elevators), it offered the versatility needed by the VVS.
To test both designs in real world conditions, aircraft with both wing 
designs were built as flying testbeds. The swept wing Ye-2 rolled out of GAZ-155 
in February 1955 for its first test flight and in late May, the delta wing Ye-4 flew 
for the first time.^ "̂  ̂Performance of the Ye-4 verified the conclusions drawn by 
both MiG and the TsAGI. The delta configuration was superior in all aspects, 
except for flat out speed. This was not deemed a huge obstacle. The engine that 
powered both prototypes, the VK-7, was highly underpowered. Coupled with the 
correct engine, MiG was convinced its design could exceed the 2,000km/h mark.
Engine design was assigned to the newly founded Tumansky Bureau. The 
bureau built on existing data from the defunct Mikulin bureau to create the RD- 
11, an engine that was exceptional for the time. The RD-11 created a thrust to 
weight ratio of nearly 6:1, an outstanding number for the day. It was a simple 
design, with only 3,500 parts and very importantly for MAP, was highly reliable.
Reliability and durability are two very different assets when dealing with 
jet engines. Reliability is what keeps the aircraft in the air and in combat.
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Durability determines how long a particular engine can operate. In the Soviet 
system, reliability was stressed above durability. An aircraft engine in the Soviet 
system had a very short time between overhauls, usually around 300 hours. In 
comparison, American aircraft engines required a complete overhaul after 1500 
hours. This meant the engine was removed from the airframe for a thorough re­
build. However, the nature of the Soviet supply and maintenance system dictated 
a low turn overhaul time. Combat units were not afforded the level of 
maintenance support as their Western counterparts, in part due to the limited 
education of the average Soviet conscript. Instead of overhauling equipment such 
as engines within the unit, the Soviet system prescribed a unit to draw new 
equipment from storage depots. The Soviets expected that any offensive 
operations would require only half of the hours before a major overhaul. If 
replaced when nearing the half way mark, all engines would be fresh enough to 
complete the assigned objectives in case of war. Thus, a Soviet engine was rebuilt 
on a much higher level than at individual unit level. Consequently, the quality of 
rebuild is better, but more importantly, allows the engine to be worked much 
harder, though for a shorter time, then its Western counterpart. Thus, though the 
Soviet engines were less sophisticated, they performed roughly the same as 
Western powerplants.^^^ The RD-11 fit the needs of the Soviet system perfectly. 
Though it needed a major overhaul quite often, it produced good thrust and good 
reliability.
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Sketch of the MiG-21 
The West received its first look at the new MiG designs during the 
Tushino Airshow in May o f 1956 when a Ye-2 and Ye-4 passed over the crowd. 
Interesting to note, the West believed the Ye-2, the swept wing version, to have 
already entered mass production over the delta winged Ye-4. In fact, NATO had a 
new codename for the Ye-2, Faceplate.
Tests continued with small airframe and engine changes until the first true 
pre-production MiG-21, the Ye-6, took flight in May of 1958. It was powered by 
an improved version of the Tumansky engine, the R-11F300. Catastrophe struck 
on Ye-6’s seventh test flight when, upon reaching 18,000 meters, the compressor 
blades within the engine exploded, destroying the aircraft’s hydraulic systems on
www.inetres.com/gp/ miIitary/ar/fb/Mig-21 .html 
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the aircraft. Test pilot Nefydrov attempted a dead-stick landing but failed and died 
of his bums a short time later.
Crash investigation attributed the cause of the accident to poor design in 
the nose cone/intake. When an aircraft flies at supersonic speeds shock waves are 
created by the air. The engine cannot use air moving at supersonic speed as the 
shock waves will tear the engine apart. Therefore, the air must be slowed to an 
appropriate speed and volume. As supersonic intake design was in its infancy in 
the Soviet Union, little was knovm about the cure to this problem. Eventually it 
was decided that the intake spike would be variable to adjust to the appropriate 
needs of the engine. After this issue was resolved the aircraft was ordered into 
production as the MiG-2 IF in December of 1958.
The MiG-2 IF was armed with two 30mm NR-30 cannons carrying 60 
rounds apiece and was linked to a radar ranging sight. Interestingly, the MiG-2 IF 
could not fire guided air-to-air missiles, despite MAP’s requirement to do so. It 
was rudimentary in both avionics and capability and unsurprisingly only 40 were 
produced. The next version, the MiG-2 IF-13 was the first truly successful MiG- 
2 1  109
Able to fire the new reverse-engineered AA-2 Atoll missiles, the MiG- 
2 IF-13 was the first MiG-21 to be exported outside of the Soviet Union. To 
reduce weight, one cannon was removed and magazine capacity was halved. It 
apparently handled well, and was benign in flight, though it was only capable of a 
7g turn. The aircraft also featured an autopilot, threat warmng receiver and a
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seventeen percent increase in fuel capacity. It offered a highly reliable, simple 
Mach 2 capable, missile carrying fighter to foreign countries. The MiG-2 IF-13 
was produced in large quantities and license produced in India, Czechoslovakia 
and reverse engineered in China.
The next generation MiG-21, the -P , -PF and -PFM  versions were the 
most successful. This was the generation most widely in service with the North 
Vietnamese Air Force. All of these versions did away with the cannon 
completely, much as the US had done with its F-4 Phantom II. A larger radar was 
installed in the cannons place^^\ Structural improvements allowed these MiG-2 Is 
to stress the airframe to 8.5g’s. A more powerful version of the Tumansky RD-11 
engine was also installed. Later, a two seat training variant, the MiG-21 US, 
capable of firing AA-2 Atoll infra-red missiles was designed. It was assigned the 
NATO codename MONGOL. In the end, over 12,000 MiG-21 ’s have been built, 
with construction continuing in China.
Further versions of MiG-21 ’s were designed, but were too late to serve in 
Vietnam. However, the MiG-21 still flies with many countries. Some countries, 
such as Romania, have opted to discontinue flying their more expensive aircraft, 
such as the MiG-29 or -23, in favor of the cheaper, more easily maintained MiG- 
21. Companies such as Israeli Aircraft Industries upgrade MiG-21 ’s with modem 
avionics and fire control systems at a fraction of the price of buying new aircraft. 
lAI coupled with Romania to produce the Lancer, the most advanced version of
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the MiG-21 to date. MIG-MAPO (the company MiG is under presently) is 
offering an upgrade that it hopes can help pull MiG out of its current economic 
woes. These upgrades include new high power Doppler radar systems, glass 
cockpits and the ability to fire guided air-to ground munitions. The MIG-MAPO 
upgrade also includes the RD-33 engine, the same engine that powers the MiG- 
29. For both companies upgrades includes reinforcement of the airframe to 
withstand more flight hours. The interest in these upgrade options is, in part, due 
to the versatility and reliability of the original airframe, but is also because the 
MiG-21 is a forgiving and easy aircraft to fly. This is evidenced by the large 
number of MiG-21 ’s flown by civilians in the US.
The MiG-21 in Vietnam
Appearing to intercept a flight o f F-4’s in April, 1966, the MiG-21 ’s 
changed the threat environment over North Vietnam. Since 1965 North 
Vietnamese pilots of the 92 U* Fighter Regiment had been training in the Soviet 
Union to fly the MiG-21. Initially the NVAF received the gun-less MiG-2 IF-13 
from the Soviets; however they were augmented by cannon carrying MiG-2 IPF’s, 
arriving in the spring of 1966. At first the NVAF command was reluctant to allow 
its new high speed interceptor to engage manned American aircraft. The MiG-21 
pilots became acquainted with their new mounts by intercepting and destroying 
unmanned American Firebee reconnaissance drones. The first Firebee was
Vlad, Danut. “Whatever happened to...Rom ania’s Floggers?" Air Forces Monthly. (June 
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downed in March o f 1966. The North Vietnamese used the experience to gain 
knowledge as to the use of their radar and missile systems. These skills would 
prove valuable when engaging manned aircraft. By April, the NVAF command 
structure felt confident enough to allow its pilots to attempt intercepts on 
American manned aircraft.
During April and May of that year, MiG-2 Is participated in numerous 
interceptions, firing over 14 Atoll missiles. However, they achieved no hits and 
suffered numerous losses due to enemy fire and fuel starvation. It was proving 
difficult for the inexperienced NVAF pilots to manage the radar and fire control 
systems at the same time. The system in the MiG-21 required the MiG pilot to 
keep the target in his radar sights, while firing an Atoll, a skill that took much 
practice. MiG-21 pilots did not score their first kill until June, when they downed 
a solitary F-105D Thunderchief.
Soon new tactics were implemented. Having transitioned from the highly 
maneuverable but slower MiG-17, most NVAF MiG-21 pilots had failed to 
exploit their new aircrafts potential. They were also using tactics that had been 
developed for the MiG-17, tactics that did not work in the MiG-21. It was decided 
that the MiG-17’s and -2Ts should operate in concert, exploiting each others 
strength. Therefore, the MiG-17’s would patrol at low altitudes, under 1,500 
meters, while the MiG-21 ’s would patrol at higher altitudes, up to 3,000 meters. 
The MiG-17’s would engage and disperse the American formations with cannon 
fire, while the high flying MiG-21 would dive from above and engage stragglers
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that had broken away.^^"  ̂This tactic was very reminiscent of Soviet MiG-15 
tactics during the Korean War.
MiG pilots over Vietnam enjoyed distinct advantages over their American 
rivals. They were intimately familiar with the country’s terrain, particularly the 
mountain ranges, and exploited this at every advantage. They were also flying 
over their own air defense network and thus they could drag pursuing enemy 
aircraft over SAM and AAA sites. This tactic was not without peril for the MiG, 
as the NVAF pilot ran a risk of being shot down by the anti-aircraft installation 
himself. O f utmost importance was the vast network of radar and ground control 
sites throughout North Vietnam. These allowed the MiG pilot to receive up-to- 
date, comprehensive information, and allowed the GCI to vector the MiG into 
optimum firing position without the MiG pilots having to turn on his own radar. 
During Operation Rolling Thunder (1965 to 1968), as the air offensive over North 
Vietnam strikes against airfields were prohibited. There was also a 30 mile buffer 
zone between China and Vietnam in which US aircraft were not permitted to fly. 
NVAF MiG pilots took full advantage of these “safe zones” when planning and 
launching attacks.
Though the MiG-21 ’s succeeded in downing only 10 American aircraft in 
1966, they intercepted 192 flights, causing 107 of them to jettison their bombs 
before reaching their target. These numbers show that despite the Fishbeds poor 
performance in combat, it was causing disruption. Frustrated that the MiG’s could
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not be attacked on the ground, the USAF developed a plan to ambush and destroy 
the MiG-21 ’s in the air.
I
.  J .  .  •
116
A North Vietnamese MiG-21
Operation Bolo was conceived by Col. Robin Old, commander of the 8^ 
Tactical Fighter Wing in Udon, Thailand. His plan was to ambush NVAF MiG- 
21 ’s by mimicking F-105 ingress routes, call signs and formations in F-4 
Phantoms. When the MiG’s intercepted what they believed were F-105 fighter- 
bombers, the F-4’s would engage and destroy the MiG’s. The plan required a 
large number of American fighters including 14 flights of F-4’s, 6 flights o f F- 
105D for SEAT) (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses), 4 flights of F-104 
Starfighters and numerous flights of support tankers and AW ACS. The key to 
surprising the MiG’s was twofold. First, the MiG’s needed to be tricked into 
engaging the group. This was accomplished by imitating F-105 characteristics, 
such as speed, altitude and call signs. Once this was accomplished, the escape 
route back to their airfields and into the protected airspace near the Chinese
Artwork courtesy o f  Tom Cooper, editor o f  ACIG.org 
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border must be cut off by another flight o f F-4’s. This is a variation of the 
hammer and anvil infantry tactic. One group, mimicking the F-105 would be the 
hammer. Upon realizing their mistake, the MiG’s would rapidly attempt to 
disengage and flee. They would run into the other group of F-4’s, the anvil. 
Between these two groups, the MiG’s would be under pressure from both sides, 
much like a piece o f metal between a hammer and anvil.
Having learned the lessons of 1966, F-4 crews were briefed to not attempt 
to engage in turning dogfights with the MiG’s but rather use their superior 
acceleration and radar to achieve a firing solution. This operation required a large 
degree of cooperation between the flights of fighters. The mission was set for 
January 2,
1967.
USAF F-4 Phantom II 118
The weather on the 2 January proved less than favorable. Though a one 
hour delay was instituted, it was decided to go ahead with the mission. Col. Robin 
Olds led the first flight near Phuc Yen airfield, hoping to entice the MiG’s into 
battle. However, the MiG’s did not respond until the second flight of F-4 s.
118 artwork courtesy o f  Tom Cooper, editor o f  ACIG.org
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mimicking F-105’s appeared. The weather was bad enough that part of the 
covering force could not cover their assigned sector and did not see any MiG’s. 
Regardless, a large air battle developed with a fifteen mile radius of Phuc Yen 
airfield resulting in seven MiG-21’s downed with no losses to the USAF F-4’s. 
According to Col Olds, “We outflew, outshot and outfought them.” *̂̂  The loss 
was considerable for the VNAF, as they lost nearly half of their sixteen MiG-21’s. 
For the next few days the USAF continued its deception operations and destroyed 
an additional two MiG-21’s.
After a terrible mauling at the hands of the USAF, the 92 Fighter 
Regiment was given a reprieve by the NVAF high command. Operation of the 
MiG-21 virtually ceased. Attacks by its stable mate, the MiG-17, continued 
unabated despite suffering great losses; seven losses in one day on April 13, 1967. 
Though MiG-21 ’s occasionally operated in concert with MiG-17’s in the next few 
months, they were not as prominent as their brethren.
During Operation Bolo the losses suffered by the VNAF were expensive 
in terms of pilots, not aircraft. There were a number of MiG-21 in crates in 
Haiphong awaiting transport and assembly to replace aircraft losses. Both the 
Soviet Union and China continued to provide North Vietnam with a nearly 
endless supply o f weapons, including MiG’s. At times, the number of aircraft 
exceeded the number of pilots. Pilots, however, took more time to replace and 
train. Though MiG-21 ’s did not participate much in aerial combat in 1967 or
Aces and Aerial Victories Pg 41
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1968, a number were shot down by US Navy picket ships as they attempted to 
either bomb or fly reconnaissance near the naval picket line. On November 1, 
1968, President Johnson called a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and thus 
ended the first chapter in aerial combat over Vietnam. Engagements between 
MiG’s and US aircraft would not renew until May 8̂ "̂ , 1972, when President 
Nixon initiated Operation Linebacker I and II. During this four year lull in 
hostilities, both sides vigorously trained and prepared their forces.
The US was eager to reverse the dismal kill ratio it had experienced from 
1966 to 1968. The key to reverse this trend was to leam was learning to fight the 
MiG-17 and -21 effectively with a fighter (F-4) and missiles (AIM-7 Sparrow) 
meant to destroy Soviet bombers. The Navy’s Ault report was issued outlining 
steps needed to rectify this situation. Part of the Ault report called to re-introduce 
ACM (air combat maneuvering) to fleet pilots. Meanwhile, in 1967 the CIA 
obtained a singular MiG-21 from secret sources.
An initial comparison between the F-4 and the MiG-21 showed the two 
aircraft to have comparable turn rates at high speed. While at slower speed the 
MiG-21 was slightly superior. A joint team of Navy and Air Force pilots put the 
two aircraft through tests in ACM. The MiG-21 won some, while the F-4 won 
others. The test however, were far from inconclusive, they showed the deficiency 
was not in the aircraft but in the pilots. American pilots had lost the skill 
necessary to compete in ACM, relying too heavily on their long range missiles 
and radar systems.
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After more comprehensive testing, the large delta wing of the MiG-21 
was shown to bleed energy more quickly then the F-4. This, coupled with the fact 
that the turn radius of MiG-21 and F-4 was similar at high speed, led to a tactic to 
defeat the MiG-21. When closing with a MiG-21, an F-4 pilot would initiate a 
high g, high-speed turn which the MiG would try to follow and rapidly lose 
energy. At a certain point, the F-4 would climb vertically, which the MiG-21 
lacked the energy to do, thus the F-4 could roll over and dive into a six o’clock 
position on the MiG.^^^ Now that the joint team had discovered the weakness of 
the MiG-21, it set out to teach Navy pilots how to kill them.
During the initial testing of the MiG-21, the US had only one example and 
desperately needed more aircraft in order to train its pilots. During the Six Day 
War, Israel had acquired a number of MiG-21 ’s and -17’s through defections, 
deceit and capture. Eager to rebuild its air force after the war and unable to secure 
its traditional French examples due to sanctions, Israel approached the US with a 
deal. The Israelis wanted A-4 and F-4E fighters, as well as tanks and small arms. 
In turn, they offered the US not only an ally in the Middle East, but recently 
captured MiG’s, SA-2 SAMs and Soviet tanks. Soon the US acquired a number of 
MiG’s with which to train its pilots.
The US Navy moved to establish “Top Gun”, an advanced ACM school at 
NAS Miramar in California to train its pilots to fight the MiG’s. The pilots were 
given the opportunity to fly against the MiG and many were allowed to fly the 
MiG’s. Very quickly. Navy pilots obtained the level of proficiency to counter the
Peebles pg 220 
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NVAF threat. The Navy also improved teamwork between the pilot and his 
backseat RIO (radar intercept officer). By implementing these changes the Navy 
was able to reverse the dismal trend o f its 1966-1968 kill ratio, ending the war 
with a respectable 8:1 ratio.
The Air Force did not institute a similar program until 1975 with its 
creation of Red Flag. The only major change the USAF instituted during the lull 
in fighting was the specialized training of the backseater in an F-4. Previously, the 
Air Force had simply put pilots in the back. This could cause communication 
problems between the pilot and the backseater tended to second guess the pilot. 
Soon the Air Force began training specialized WSO (Weapons System Officers, 
similar to Navy RIO’s) to operate the radar and fire control systems. This did little 
to change the USAF’s dismal record marginally improving to 2.83:1 by the wars 
end."^
The North Vietnamese also took advantage of the four year respite in 
fighting. They bolstered both their air defense structure and MiG force. By March 
of 1972, US reconnaissance showed that the NVAF had nearly 100 MiG-2 Us, 
that were now divided into two regiments, the 92 and 927^.Addiitionally the 
NVAF had 150 MiG-17 and -19’s. By now North Vietnam, boasted the world’s 
most sophisticated defense network in the world. Many more SA-2 SAM missile 
batteries were constructed since 1968. The NVAF had superb radar coverage 
throughout the whole country that in theory, allowed precise guiding o f both MiG 
and SAMs. It also allowed the North Vietnamese to detect American aircraft long 
before they entered North Vietnamese airspace, thereby allowing MiG’s to be 
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positioned. Inherent in this system was the value o f operating over friendly and 
familiar territory.
In 1972, despite the ban on bombing North Vietnam, interdiction missions 
were flown over Laos. Increasingly, MiG scrambled to thwart these missions, 
finally resulting in three MiG kills over Laos. During May of 1972, the North 
formally invaded the South and President Nixon authorized Operation 
Linebacker, an attempt to attack the supply centers of North Vietnam. This 
included for the first time, the mining o f Haiphong harbor.
The resumption of hostilities brought about the fiercest air battles seen in 
the Vietnam War. During the month of May alone, US aircrews were credited 
with dovming nearly thirty MiG’s, including nine MiG-21 ’s, while the NVAF 
shot down at least ten US aircraft. Linebacker strikes also included raids 
against the MiG bases, that disrupted the organization of the NVAF greatly. 
Accordingly, the leadership in Hanoi called the NVAF leadership to formulate a 
plan.
The NVAF decided to adopt a Western style after-action report after each 
mission. Information would be shared between the two regiments, something that 
had not been done effectively. After each action, successful or not, the pilots 
would debrief and share lessons with each other in an organized format. Though 
this format is familiar within the US armed forces, it was new to the North 
Vietnamese. Cocky pilots were frowned upon, and in some cases removed, from 
flight status for lack of respect towards the enemy’s fighting ability.
acig.org database o f  kills 
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Aside from the inexperience of many o f its young pilots, the NVAF 
suffered from a host of other problems. These included a poor command structure. 
Command decisions were often slow and ambiguous and the information that 
flowed to the commanders was often outdated, resulting in orders that made little 
sense. Additionally, though the radar net was extensive, it was not the latest 
equipment. Often operators could not understand the evolving situation and could 
not issue correct orders. In a system that frowns upon individual action, inaction 
by ground controllers led to the death o f many pilots. All of these issues had to be 
overcome if  the NVAF was to reverse the downward trend of 1972.
In late 1972, the NVAF became increasingly obsessed with shooting down 
the high flying B-52 Stratofortresses with a MiG-21. When Operation Linebacker 
II began in December of 1972, the NVAF believed itself prepared to down one of 
the bombers with their new MiG-2 IM F’s. As B-52’s flew at night and at high 
altitudes, a select cadre had to be trained for these highly dangerous night 
interceptions. Thirteen pilots were selected and trained to attempt to down a B-52.
The plan was racked with problems; MiG bases were now under daily 
attack by American F-111 ’s. Numerous time the MiG’s scrambled numerous 
times to intercept the B-52’s, though none were reported shot down. 
Embarrassingly, one MiG-21 was shot dovm by the tail gunner of a B-52 on the 
18 December and another on 24 December. Their tactics failing, the NVAF told 
their pilots to ram the B-52’s.^^  ̂Finally, on the 27 December a number of MiG- 
21’s were scrambled to intercept an incoming B-52 flight. Pilot Pham Tuan 
describes the incident:
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When I saw a yellow light in front o f me, I increased my speed to 
1200 km/h and climbed to 10,000 meters, where the B-52’s were 
cruising. I radioed to the command, “I have the target in sight, request 
order for attack”, the response came “You have permission to fire twice, 
then escape quickly”.
“The Americans were holding formation, keeping separation of 
approximately two to three kilometers. I made last minute checks to my 
missiles, and when I reached the level of the third B-52,1 pushed the fire 
button on the control stick, launching two heat seeking missiles from a 
distance o f two kilometers. Huge flames were visible around the second 
B-52 as I broke sharply to the left and descended to 2000 meters before 
landing at Yen Bai. The attacked formation immediately dropped their 
loads and returned to base. The crew of the hit B-52 was killed^^^
This loss, however, was attributed by the USAF to a SAM, rather then a MiG-21.
As the year progressed, the NVAF began to stem its losses. But by the 
years end lost forty-three aircraft, including at least thirty-eight MiG-21’s. The 
rapid expansion of the NVAF from the bombing halt of 1968 to Operation 
Linebacker brought a vast influx of new pilots. Led by a cadre of very 
experienced older pilots, these pilots did not fair well in combat, especially as 
many of the US aircrews had flown and gained experience during the strikes of 
1966-1968. The last US aircraft lost to MiG’s was recorded December 28, 1972, 
when a MiG-21 downed a US Navy RA-5C Vigilante.
The poor quality of the majority of the North Vietnamese pilots was 
obvious. They were unable to adapt to the changing tactics and aggressive nature 
of US aircrews during Operation Linebacker I and II. Records kept by the top 
Soviet advisor to the NVAF show that only half of the pilots had more than 450 
hours logged. These records showed that the NVAF had been all but destroyed by
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the air strikes, with only forty-seven of the remaining 187 aircraft operationally fit 
for combat. This is only half the story.
North Vietnam produced thirteen aces during the war with top scoring 
Nguyen Van Coc scoring at least nine. They also proved that the MiG-21 was a 
formidable foe in combat with the right pilot in the cockpit. The US admitted to 
43 losses to North Vietnamese MiG-21 ’s, most from 1972 and later. The North 
Vietnamese claimed to have downed at least double that number with their MiG- 
21 ’s. The conflict was bitter and not the one -sided ordeal the Bekka Valley 
would become ten years later. The air war over Vietnam was a hard fought battle 
by both sides and it was the superior pilot, not the aircraft, who won every 
engagement.
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Chapter VII
The MiG-23 and the Air War over the Bekka Valley
Israeli Air Force (lAF) operations during the 1982 Operation Peace for 
Galilee against the Syrian Air Force (SyAF) are representative of third generation 
fighter aircraft and tactics. The Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon was in 
response to increased activity by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
In May of 1982 an assassination attempt was carried out London by elements of 
the PLO on the Israeli ambassador to the UK in. In turn, Israel reacted with 
punitive strikes against PLO targets inside of Lebanon. At the time, the PLO was 
embroiled not only with a quasi-war against Israel, but involved in a civil war 
within Lebanon. The PLO was supported by Syria in the Lebanese Civil War 
against the Christian militias, who in turn were, supported by Israel.
After the assassination attempt by the PLO hostilities escalated. Punitive 
strikes into southern Lebanon prompted Syria to massively reinforce its SA-6 
SAM batteries in Lebanon; eventually 19 such sites were established. The 
gesture was not meant as an offensive threat by the Syrians, as they did not want 
direct action against the Israelis. Rather it was probably meant as a deterrent to
It should be noted the both the lAF and SyAF employed second generation aircraft such as the 
F-4 Phantom II by the Isrealis and the MiG-21 Fishbed by the Syrians. However for the purpose o f  
this work, effort will be made to concentrate upon combat with only third generation aircraft.
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flirther punitive strikes. Arab nations had learned well the lessons of a 
compressive and stout umbrella as a deterrent to lAF aircraft strikes.
During the “War of Attrition” (1967-1970) between Israel and the Arab 
nations, particularly Egypt the lAF, suffered heavily from SAM’s. Indeed 
according to notoriously conservative lAF records twenty-two Israeli aircraft 
were downed by SAMs. This was a great loss to the lAF, but the Yom Kippur 
War of 1973 would show the lAF the true potential of a well built missile 
umbrella; as forty lAF aircraft (or fourteen percent of the total lAF inventory) was 
lost to both AAA and SAMs within the first forty-eight hours of the conflict.
Thus, the build-up of Syrian SA-6 SAM sites in southern Lebanon was 
unacceptable to the lAF, regardless of Syrian intentions. This, coupled with 
increased cross border activity by the PLO, led to the June 6, 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon.
After the serious losses to enemy air defenses during the Yom Kippur 
War, the LAF took seriously the threat of Syrian SA-6’s. In preparation for the 
invasion Israel trained heavily against mock SAM sites it built in the Negev 
desert. Israel was determined not repeat the dismal performance of nine years 
earlier. On June 9 the lAF attacked the SAM sites located in the strategic Bekka 
Valley, destroying within ten minutes 17 of the 19 SA-6 sites and many more SA- 
3 and SA-2 sites, while suffering no losses. The remaining two SA-6 sites were 
destroyed in follow-up strikes the next morning. With the Israeli attack on Syrian 
SAM sites and their subsequent destruction, Syria had no choice but to engage the
SAM- Surface to Air missile 
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lAF in the air. Thus the stage was set for the largest air battles since the end of the 
Second World War. This battle was also to be the baptism of fire for both 
American and Soviet third generation aircraft, among them the Soviet MiG-23 
(NATO codename FLOGGER).
Baptism of Fire for the Flogger
Soviet aircraft designers during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s strove to 
achieve equilibrium with new American fighter aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat, 
F-111 Aardvark (or as the Australians refer to it, “the Pig”) and eventually the F- 
15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon. Though a successful design, the MiG-21 
FISHBED would be outclassed by the newest generation of Western aircraft both 
in speed and weapons systems. To create an aircraft capable of engaging the 
newest generation of Western aircraft, Soviet Frontal Aviation, through the TsKB, 
issued an order for a new fighter in 1964.^^  ̂The aircraft was to be faster than the 
Fishbed and able to carry a greater load. Additionally it would have a BVR 
(Beyond Visual Range) capability similar to the American F-4 Phantom. Within 
the established tradition of Frontal Aviation, it was also required to operate from 
improvised runways.
Two new technologies were explored to allow both high speed flight, and 
low takeoff and landing speeds needed to operate from improvised fields. The 
first techonlgy was variable thrust engines capable of directing thrust downward
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to help lift the a i r c r a f t / T h e  second was a variable geometry winged aircraft 
capable of “swinging” its wings as the aerodynamic situation demanded. These 
requirements led the MiG design team to create a fighter technically more 
advanced then anything the Soviet Union had fielded.
The Soviet Union had been aware of the developments made at the 
NASA/NACA research facilities in Langley, Virginia, through both secret and 
open sources, towards variable sweep winged aircraft. Variable angle wings 
allowed aircraft to “swing” their wings to the demands needed for both high lift 
situations, such as takeoff and also low drag situations, such as supersonic flight, 
within the same sortie. This was exactly what was needed for the new fighter 
aircraft. Concurrently, a project was underway to use variable thrust engines to 
meet the same demand. Both designs eventually resulted in prototype aircraft and, 
in much the same fashion used by Western designers, a competition was initiated. 
On July 9, 1967 both aircraft displayed their technolgy for the public at a military 
air show in Domodedovo. The variable geometry (vg) aircraft was designated 
Flogger by NATO while the variable thrust engined prototype was labeled 
Faithless."^
The VG aircraft demonstrated superiority over the variable thrust aircraft 
during the ensuing competition. Though meeting the requirements of the TsKB, 
the variable thrust aircraft fell short of the performance of the VG aircraft. It 
simply did not have the fuel efficiency, its engines took up too much room within 
the fuselage and the weight of the systems cut into payload capacity. The VG
This technology was later used in the Soviets answer to the British Harrier, the Yak-38 
FORGER that was adopted by the Soviet Navy in the 1970’s.
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aircraft won the competition easily and its design was accepted by the TsKB as 
the MiG-23S.
Sketch of MiG-23 and two seat MiG-23UB 136
First delivered to VVS units in 1972, the newly designated MiG-23S was 
issued in limited numbers. The final tally totaled around 100 aircraft. Though 
the MiG-23 aerodynamically won the design competition, the radar and fire 
control systems that would allow the BVR capability dictated by the TsKB were 
not ready to be fielded. The radar unit, (NATO codename HIGHLARK), was 
designed with data and hardware acquired from the captured remains of the 
Westinghouse AN/AWG-10 in F-4 Phantoms shot down over Vietnam. The
^̂ ĥttp://www.todo-aviones-com.ar/rusos/mig23/mig-23-scheme.jpg 
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HIGHLARK radar unit was quite an advance over the previous JAYBIRD radar 
found in later MiG-21 ’s. The HIGHLARK’s Doppler pulse system, operated in 
the J band, possessed a search range of 50 miles and a tracking range o f 35 
miles/^^ More importantly, the new radar unit allowed the devolvement o f a 
completely new fire control system capable of firing the new R-23 (NATO 
Codename AA-7 APEX) BVR semi-active radar guided missile.
VVS units complained the initial batch of MiG-23 S’s were underpowered 
and lacked the promised acceleration. Thus, when the new MiG-23M was 
introduced it was powered by the much more powerful Tumansky R-29-300 
engine, making the MiG-23M the first Flogger that was truly defined by its fast 
acceleration and high speed. In addition the MiG-23M featured the incorporation 
of the HIGHLARK radar and fire control system, a step over the system found in 
the MiG-23 S. Soviet airpower theorists learned much from the war in Vietnam, 
including the effectiveness of high speed slashing attacks by MiG-21’s. They also 
learned the capability of the better equipped American F-4’s to engage the nimble 
MiG-21, on their own terms by utilizing their higher speed and better radars. Thus 
the MiG-23 was a departure from the standard Soviet air superiority fighter. The 
MiG-21 was a highly maneuverable, low weight aircraft capable of turning inside 
of, and defeating, most Western fighter in a traditional dogfight. However, the 
tactics used by the Americans in Vietnam helped to negate this feature and the 
Vietnamese resorted to high speed, single pass slashing tactics. The MiG-23 was 
optimized for just this tactic.
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Most Western aircraft that incorporate VG technology, the F-111 and the 
F-14 in particular, are highly maneuverable. This was not the case with the MiG- 
23. In fact its wings can only be swept to three preset positions-16deg, 45deg and 
72deg- for takeoff/landing, cruise/maneuver and high speed respectively. Pilots 
who have flown in or against the Flogger describe it as performing much the same 
as the 1960’s vintage American F-104 Starfighter. The Flogger is extremely fast 
while climbing and in straight line performance, but not very maneuverable in a 
d o g f i g h t . O n e  British Tornado pilot, escorting a MiG-23 to an airshow in the 
UK during the 1990’s states, ‘The lack of visibility for the pilot of the Flogger 
was plainly obvious, as was its lack of maneuverability even in this undemanding 
environment- the wings were never swept throughout the flight and when it turned 
it did so with rigid, angular movements.” "̂̂*
This statement came from a Tornado pilot flying a highly maneuverable 
VG equipped aircraft and is especially telling. VG technology is incorporated in 
the MiG-23 to meet the requirements of a high speed aircraft capable of operating 
from short, improvised landing strips, not to increase its maneuverability. This is 
another case o f the Soviet design bureau’s difficulty overcoming the “requirement 
pull”, a design implemented to satisfy a requirement, rather than the West’s 
tradition of “technology push” whereby a new technology dictates requirements.
The MiG-23 was a substantial technological leap from the fairly simplistic 
MiG-21. The transition of pilots from one aircraft to the other was not as smooth 
as the VVS had hoped; in fact the Flogger’s accidental loss rate was quite
140 Peebles pg 235 
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astounding. Originally, there had been no plans for a two seat trainer version, 
but in 1973 TsKB and the VVS began conversion o f a number of MiG-23 M 
airframes to two-seat trainer MiG-23UM’s, to help alleviate some of these 
problems. The aircraft was quite difficult to fly, even by American standards.
The US acquired a number of MiG’s, including MiG-17’s, -21’s and 23’s, 
through sources like Israel (who had received them from defectors) and Egypt 
(who in the early 1980’s, began an era of military friendship with the US). The 
MiG’s were put through their paces and treated much as any "black” project 
would at the secret airfield near Groom Lake, Nevada. However, the MiG-23 
proved to be a difficult aircraft to master even for the experienced pilots of the 
USAJF test squadron based at Groom Lake. On April 26, 1984, Lt General Robert 
Bond was killed flying a MiG-23, possibly in a mock interception against the then 
new, F-117A Stealth Fighter. According to Air Force reports. Bond was in a high­
speed, high-altitude run when he attempted a high-G right turn. As recorded voice 
transcripts from the accident report demonstrated. Bond lost control of the aircraft 
in a spin he could not recover firom. He was forced to eject, and was subsequently 
killed. Investigation of the accident revealed all systems on the aircraft were 
performing normally prior to the departure from controlled flight. The accident 
was ruled as pilot error. That Bond was a highly experienced test pilot supported 
what had been reported previously by defecting MiG-23 pilots the MiG-23 had a 
tendency to spin in high speed, high G situations. ̂ "*̂ It is also apparent that the
Butowski pg 102 
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Soviet lost many aircraft in similar situations. Also evident was a fault within the 
wing pivot mechanism that had a tendency to separate at inopportune times.
Though the MiG-23 was designed as an interceptor/fighter a fighter 
bomber version was also created. Though derived from the MiG-23 airftame, it 
was given the designation the MiG-27, though NATO did not assign it a new 
codename. The MiG-27 had a totally redesigned nose to increase over the nose 
visibility and to house new sensors. It also had a greater payload, albeit at a 
sacrifice to speed, and carried a new six barrel Gatling 30mm cannon for 
attacking armored targets. Importantly the MiG-27 lacked air-to-air radar, though 
it retained the ability to fire infra-red guided Atoll missiles.
The MiG-23/27 saw heavy service with the VVS in Afghanistan in the 
ground support role. On some occasions the aircrafy were engaged by Pakistani 
Air Force F-16’s after crossing the Pakistani frontier, with negative results during 
all engagements. Iraq heavily deployed the MiG-23 in its war against Iran in the 
1980’s, though information about its success is limited at best. The only true air 
battle fought by the MiG-23 was in the Bekka Valley during the 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. Due to high maintenance and high accident rates coupled 
with low success rates in combat, the MiG-23 was withdrawn from Russian 
service in 1997. Perhaps one of the largest disappointments for MiG OKB, the 
Flogger became fodder for the Israeli Air Force in the skies over Lebanon.
The Air War over the Bekka Valley
Spick 478
On January 4*, 1989 two Libyan M iG -23’s were intercepted by F-14 Tomcats from the carrier 
Nimitz in the Gulf o f  Sidra. The resulting engagement ended with both Floggers being downed in 
quick succession by the U SN  aviators. Taped recording o f  that engagement can be found at 
http://www.flight-level.com/dogfrght/
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Aerial combat over the skies of the Bekka Valley in June of 1982 was 
decidedly one-sided. Israel claimed a 100:1 kill ratio over the Syrian Air Force, 
greater than kill ratios in 1967 (30:1) or 1973 (50:1).^"^  ̂Though the purpose of 
this study is not to investigate kill ratios, one must take both Syrian and Israeli 
claims with a grain of salt.^^^ Both countries have a propensity to exaggerate their 
victories, in fact, most historians and military officials back the claim that Israel 
did lose a small number of aircraft (1-3) to air-to-air combat with the Syrians in 
the Bekka Valley. Any observer to that battle could plainly see that the Syrian 
were outfought, however the purpose of this work is to examine the MiG-23’s 
role in combat, along with the reasons for the dismal performance by the Syrian 
Air Force.
When Israel began strikes against SA-6 batteries within the Bekka Valley, 
the Syrian Air Force was obligated to meet the threat posed by the IDF to both 
Syria proper and her forces within Lebanon. Syrian pilots in both elderly MiG- 
21 ’s and cutting edge MiG-23M’s met similar fates at the hand of Israeli pilots, 
more often than not they were destroyed before even detecting the lAF Fighters. 
However, the majority of these losses were not the fault of the aircraft, but rather
Van Creveld, Martin. The Sword and the Olive. A Critical History o f  the Israeli Defense 
Force.(Public Affairs, 1998.) pg 295
A RAND corporation report to the USAF claims “Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that much o f  the press comment that has appeared on the Bekka Valley operation has been the 
product o f  Israeli disinformation.” Lambeth, Benjamin.M oscow’s Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon 
Air War. (RAND. Project Air Force Report. Santa Monica, CA 1984) Pg 4
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the fault of either the pilots, ground commanders or the Syrian military as a 
whole.
Riad Ashkar, an authority on the IDF, in an interview in The Journal o f  
Palestinian Affairs during the summer of 1978, was asked how the MiG-23 
compared to new. Western supplied aircraft of Israel. He stated that “The MiG-23 
is in some ways superior to the F-4; it is to some extent comparable with the latest 
American fighters” "̂*̂ These fighter include the F-15 and F-16,both employed by 
the Israelis in the Bekka Valley. An anonymous lAF officer took it further saying 
“The problem was that [Syrian] pilots didn’t do things at the right time or in the 
right place.. .the pilots behaved as if they knew they were going to be shot down 
and waited to see to when it was going to happen and not how to prevent it or 
attempt to shoot us down.. .They could have been flying the best fighter in the 
world, but if  they flew it the way they were flying we would have shot them down 
in exactly the same way. It wasn’t the fault of the equipment, but rather their 
tactics.” When asked what the lAF learned about Syrian MiG-25 Foxbat 
operations lAF commander. General Eitan stated “Answering that question is 
difficult, because the Syrians did not know how to fly or operate the MiG-25. If 
we had been flying the MiG-25 nobody would have touched us.” ^̂  ̂ Even the 
Soviets, notorious for institutionalized military thinking, seem to have learned a 
lesson from the Bekka Valley campaign. In a TASS release after the war a Soviet 
general is quoted as saying “to fully use these capabilities (i.e. the MiG-23), those
Ashkar, Riad and Kassim Jaafar. “Military Options in the Middle East” The Journal o f  
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who exploit and maintain this equipment must posses comprehensive and deep 
k n o w l e d g e . T h e  entire performance o f the Syrian Air Force is best described 
by Ezer Weizman, former lAF commander: “The human factor will decide the 
fate of war, of all wars. Not the Mirage (a type of French supplied lAF fighter), 
nor any other plane, and not the screwdriver, or the wrench or radar or missiles or 
all the newest technology and electrical innovations. Men-, and not just men of 
action, but men of thought. Men for whom the expression ‘by ruses shall ye make 
war’ is a philosophy of life, not just the object of lip service” If it was not the 
fault o f the MiG’s in which the Syrian were flying, why were the losses by the 
SyAF so high?.
Israel dominated the airspace over the Bekka Valley in every possible 
aspect, this made offensive and even defensive operations by Syria nearly 
impossible. Israel had excellent intelligence about Syrian MiG operations. 
Lebanon was the first war to make heavy use of RPV (remote piloted vehicle) 
technology. Israel had long been developing its own indigenous design. By 1982 
Israel had deployed its RPV called, quite fittingly, the Scout. Using its long range 
cameras, the Scout was able to relay a real-time picture of Syrian MiG’s taking 
off from airbases within Syria. This information was relayed to an orbiting E-2C 
Hawkeye AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft. The 
Hawkeye was equipped with an APS-125 radar mounted above the fuselage, able
Lambeth pg 16 The Soviet military seems to have been quite dismayed by the performance o f  
their equipment in Syrian hands. Jokes circulated through the Soviet officer staff that during the 
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to scan 3 million cubic miles of airspace, monitor over 200 aircraft 
simultaneously and control over 150 engagements at ranges of over 250 miles 
A controller sitting within the Hawkeye would relay the information to lAF pilots 
who would either engage or egress the area, depending on the situation. Thus, 
every move the Syrians made was monitored from takeoff to eventual shoot down 
by the lAF.
Syrian pilots however, were trained in the Soviet fashion of GCI (Ground 
Control Intercept) engagements. GCI interceptions were dictated to a pilot by a 
controller inside a ground radar station. Little room was left for proactive flying. 
Additionally, Syrian GCI control also because the radar range was somewhat 
limited by the mountainous terrain of southern Lebanon. Syrian pilots found this 
all to be a moot point though, as Israel effectively jammed data and voice link 
communication between both GCI and pilot with state of the art ECM (Electronic 
Counter Measures) gear, thus negating any control. Trained in the strict Soviet 
system, Syrian pilots found themselves without guidance and flew blindly, not 
knowing what to do next. As one Western observer noted T watched a group of 
Syrian fighter planes fly figure-eights. They just flew around and around and 
obviously had no idea what to do n e x f M e a n w h i l e  Israel utilized effectively 
employed counter-jamming technology and was able to respond quickly to any 
attempt by Syria to jam its communication lines. Israel dominated all aspects 
necessary for warfare on a modem battlefield, command, control and 
communication (C^).
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Though MiG’s themselves may not have been to blame for the horrific 
losses suffered by Syria, certainly the armament they carried was inferior to 
missiles carried by lAF fighters. Syrian fighters were armed with AA-2 ATOLL 
infra-red heat seeking missiles. These missiles were rear aspect only; they could 
only be fired from behind a target. They were comparable to early Vietnam era 
American AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles and had similar PK (probability of kill) of 
ratios o f about 19 percent. On the other hand, the Israelis employed the latest 
generation o f AIM-9 Sidewinders missiles, the AIM-9L. Earlier that year during 
the Falklands, British Harriers scored 25 hits for 27 launches against faster, more 
maneuverable aircraft in poor weather to achieve a pk of 93 percent. Sunilar pk
http://www.libanmall.com/mam/map.htm
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ratios were achieved by the I s r a e l i s / T h e  missile also gave the lAF another 
great advantage. The L model Sidewinder was an all-aspect heat seeking missile.
It could acquire, lock on and be fired against a target at any angle, including head 
on. Achieving the traditional “6 o ’clock” position behind a target in a dogfight 
was no longer needed. The lAF achieved the majority of its kills as MiG’s closed 
with lAF fighters, never giving Syrians pilots an opportunity to maneuver. Hence 
most kills achieved by the lAF occurred without the Syrian pilots releasing any 
weapons.
Regardless of these reasons, the Syrian Air Force was defeated. The SyAF 
lacked effective training of both pilots and ground crew. Syrian pilots were 
trained in the rigid standard of the 1970’s Soviet doctrine, one that eschewed the 
principle of domination of the air by sheer numbers. By constantly sending up 
available fighters to engage the lAF, Syria followed just that doctrine. It is 
important to note however that this tactic also requires a numerical superiority 
over the enemy, which the Warsaw Pact would have over NATO, but Syria did 
not posses over Israel.
Syrian pilots were trained to rely on GCI for their every movement. As a 
result, they failed to exploit any advantage that presented itself, such as the 
maneuverability o f the MiG-21 or the blazing speed of the MiG-23. When GCI 
control ceased, Syrian pilots lacked the initiative to take the fight to the Israelis. 
Soviet doctrines might have worked very well in a war in Europe, The W S  
would have held a huge numerical advantage and would be able to sustain great 
losses in a European conflict. They would not have had to shoot down every 
Hurley
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NATO fïghter-bomber, only disrupt their missions so that Soviet ground forces 
could advance. The VVS would have been ready to accept massive losses to 
ensure that ground forces achieved their objectives. This was not the case in 
Syria. The Syrian Air Force could not sustain massive losses, thus the entire 
doctrine of domination through numbers was flawed.
Even when viewed by their Soviet counterparts, Syrian pilots were poor. 
After the 1973 war, the air force was decimated. Most pilots who flew in 1982 
were young and inexperienced. They did not fly as many hours as their Israeli or 
even Soviet counterparts. When commenting on the performance of the SyAF 
during the war, one senior VVS officer noted “it is all very well that GCI 
operators should assist us fighter pilots.. .one should not rely on their support for 
everything” Even Soviet pilots knew personal initiative in the air was valuable.
The Israeli domination of C^, coupled with superior training, intimate 
familiarity Avith its geography, and the fact that the lAF had flown over the Bekka 
Valley unopposed for years, allowed the lAF to dominate the largest air battle 
seen since the end of the Second World War. Though the MiG-23 did not perform 
well during it baptism of fire, it did not perform poorly either. Rather the support 
structure that flew, maintained and controlled it was fatally flawed. The MiG-23 
was not inferior, the Syrians were. The war was won through LAF domination of 
airspace and was an indicator of future air-to-air combat. Combat would no longer 
be a close maneuvering fight, but rather BVR and head on shots that would 
require high levels o f coordination and training to succeed.
Lambeth pg30
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In an ironic twist, the invasion of Lebanon began with total domination of 
Syrian armed forces by Israel, with the lAF achieving kill ratios that are the 
highest ever achieved. It did so through technology and training, yet the war in 
Lebanon rekindled a civil war within Lebanon and created a guerilla war that 
neither the lAF nor IDF were prepared to handle. The war that began in such a 
spectacular manner soon became a quagmire, and as Martin van Creveld in his 
book The Sword and the Olive observed, it nearly tore the nation of Israel apart. 
The Lebanese War became Israel’s Vietnam. It was the only war which Israel did 
not win and the first war to see massive dissent within the country. Initial “shock 
and awe” victories against a conventional army did not guarantee victory in the 
subsequent guerilla war.
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Chapter VIII
Wars o f  the 90’s and the Scoreless MiG-29
The MiG-29 Fulcrum, currently a front line fighter in Russia, Ukraine, 
India and many other nations, has not enjoyed much good publicity since it’s 
unveiling to the West in 1986. From highly public airshow crashes in England and 
France to its dismal performance in places such as Eritrea, Serbia and Iraq, the 
MiG-29 has been overshadowed by the more successful and perhaps more 
glamorous cousin, the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker. The MiG-29 has scored no 
confirmed kills in aerial combat, except two US civil registered Cessna’s, flown 
by anti-Castro Cuban activists, downed by the Cuban Air Force. It has been on the 
receiving end of kills by aircraft from countries as varied as Holland and Ethiopia. 
However, despite its fruitless record, the MiG-29 is still regarded as an able 
fighter in today’s threat environment. India has recently selected the navalized 
version, the MiG-29K, to serve on their new aircraft carrier, the former Russian 
Naval Ship, Admiral Gorshokov. Other Southeast Asia countries are 
purportedly looking at the MiG-29 to replace their aging fleets of 1960’s vintage 
fighters. Even Peru operates the Fulcrum.
A vindicating factor for the Fulcrum was the German Luftwaffe’s 
successftil operation of an entire squadron of MiG-29’s, until mid 2004. It had 
inherited the MiG-29’s from the former East Germany after reunification. German 
Fulcrums, flown by well-trained Luftwaffe pilots, were regular as aggressors in 
NATO exercises and have become proof positive that the MiG-29 has a place in
Kappan, Rasheed. “Indo-Russian Deal on MÎG-29K Ready” The Hindu Online [India]. 
February 11, 2001. http://www.hindu.eom/thehindu/2001/02/l l/stories/02110004.htm
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today’s air forces. After fighting the German Fulcrums most Western pilots agree 
that, despite some problems, the MiG-29 is a capable WVR (Within Visual 
Range) combat aircraft. Some even concede its superiority in that realm over 
similar American aircraft.
Its fleet is too large to economically operate, to pay debts to former 
satellite nations such as Slovakia, Russia has been using the MiG-29 lending to its 
growing popularity. As if  to prove the MiG-29 poses a threat, the USAF, through 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program funding, bought twenty-one nuclear 
capable MiG-29S’s from M o l d o v a . I n  much the same fashion as the MiG-21, 
Western companies are beginning to offer upgrade packages to extend the MiG- 
29’s usable lifespan. These efforts have been despite the fact the MiG-29 has yet 
to achieve a kill in true aerial combat.
The Fulcrum, bom of the arms race of the Cold War, the Fulcrum is now 
at the heart of the imperiled success o f MiG OKB as they progress into the 2U  ̂
century. The future of the company relies on the success or failure of Fulcrum 
sales in the near future.
The Fulcrum
As the air war over Vietnam unfolded and evolved, the United States was 
only one o f the interested parties. The Soviet Union watched intently as tactics
Hehs, Eric. “Schlemming with the Fulcrums, F-16/M1G-29 training in Italy” Code One 
Magazine. Lockheed Aeronautics Company, June 1995.
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104
and technology began to dictate the next development in aircraft design. It soon 
became apparent that dog-fighting, once in the realm of dinosaurs, was an 
essential tool in aerial combat. Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat proved its 
limitations in Vietnam and maneuver combat was included in any new fighter 
design format in either countries. American designers built such aircraft as the F- 
16 Fighting Falcon and the F-15 Eagle in response to this new need. Not blind to 
the burgeoning trend in aerial combat, the Soviets designed the highly 
maneuverable MiG-29 (NATO codename Fulcrum) and the Sukhoi Su-27, 
(NATO codename Flanker).
During the early 1970’s, in response to realized inadequacies of frontline 
aircraft, the Soviets launched the Perspektivyni Frontovoi Istrebitel or PFl 
(Advanced Tactical Fighter) p r o g r a m . S p l i t  into two programs, MiG received a 
contract to produce a lightweight fighter, equivalent to the US F-16. Sukhoi 
received a contract for the heavy fighter to counter the American F-15. As per 
requirments by TsKB, the PFl design was to be capable of autonomous 
operations from unimproved airfields to achieve tactical battlefield air superiority. 
Secondly the PFl was to provide limited escort capability to fighter-bombers over 
hostile territory; thirdly it was to have limited ground attack capabilities. All 
these requirements were expected on top of the requirement for a highly 
maneuverable aircraft.
MiG took note of designs in the US such as the F-14 Tomcat and FX 
program (later the F-15), the TsAGl presented both design bureaus with top secret
Tartar, Easy. “M iG-29 in Study” Fighter Tactics Academy. December 2003 
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information gathered from espionage in the The secret information
included utilizing twin tails, coupled with widely spaced engines, to provide a 
lifting body shape similar to the US Navy’s F-14 Tomcat. Thus, both the Su-27 
and the MiG-29 shared many design similarities. For MiG, this design was 
important for national security, but also internally. The PFl program was the first 
design concieved after the death of Arytom Mikoyan and the retirement of 
Mikhail Gurevich. It would be a test of the bureau under its new chief, Rostislav 
Belyakov.
Belyakov joined MiG in 1941, shortly after graduating from the Moscow 
Aeronautic Institute. He participated, in most aspects with all design since then 
and was a driving force behind the MiG-23 and -25. He was also the liaison 
between MiG and the military, industrial plants and government officials. Thus 
Belyakov knew the firm from both a design and business standpoint and assumed 
the role of chief designer shortly after Mikoyan’s death in 1970. As head of the 
design bureau Belyakov’s first test was the MiG-29 design, “Product 9” within 
the Bureau.
The first flight of the prototype occurred on October 9, 1977 with MiG test 
pilot Aleksander Fedotov at the controls. The next month, the West got its first 
look at the MiG-29 when a spy satellite over flew the test airfield at Ramenskoye. 
Dubbed the RAM-L by Western analysts, it became the subject of much 
speculation and theory, most of which was untrue. Unfortunately for MiG, the 
MiG-29’s test period was fraught with problems, stemming from the newly
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developed Klimov RD-33 turbofan engines which powered the MiG. Multiple 
crashes plagued the program. Some of these crashes may have resulted in tests to 
determine the correct placement of the engines; the RD-33 was later found to be 
very sensitive to disturbed airflow. Two prototypes crashed in 1978 and 1980 
respectively and the MiG-29 did not enter service with the W S  until 1983, while 
the PVO did not receive its first MiG-29's until 1984.
The West received its first close-up view of the MiG-29 in 1986. Between 
Julyl and July 4, six MiG-29’s flew to Rissala Air Base in Finland as part of an 
ongoing cooperative exchange program between the Soviets and Finns. This 
program also brought the MiG-23 and the MiG-2 Ibis to the West for the first time 
in 1983 and 1974 respectively. After a display by MiG pilot Vladimir Chilin, it 
was apparent to all onlookers that the MiG-29 was a highly maneuverable aircraft, 
an observation that would be built upon two years later. The MiG-29 also landed 
in the impressively short distance o f 450 meters, proving it could operate from 
dispersed airfields.
In 1988, quite unexpectedly, two MiG-29’s appeared at the Famborough 
Airshow. Also present was chief designer Belyakov and his deputy designer 
Mikhail Waldenberg. This was a first for a Western airshow! The MiG-29 
performed both solo and joint routines, putting on a display that impressed 
Western onlookers. Of particular interest was a sustained 9 g, 360® turn in 12.5 
seconds and another 360° turn with a radius of 700 meters, at speeds approaching
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8 0 0 k m / h . However, the most impressive display was saved for last, when test 
pilot Anatoily Kvotchur performed a tail, or “Cobra” slide at extremely low 
altitude. Though not particularly dangerous when performed at altitude, the MiG- 
29 demonstrated it ability to fly vertically to a stop, slide backwards with its nose 
still in the vertical position and recover quickly to a flyable speed. Western 
onlookers were amazed when this dangerous maneuver was performed at an 
altitude less than 1,000 meters. According by the MiG designers this maneuver is 
a feasible combat tactic as it breaks the lock of Doppler radar systems. However 
in later years it was discovered not be viable with a full compliment of fuel and 
weapons on the aircraft.
Sketch of MiG-29
Butowski pg 114
Tartar, Easy. “MiG-29 in Study” Fighter Tactics Academy. December 2003 
http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29.htm
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It was at the annual Paris Airshow in 1989 that the MiG-29 gained 
notoriety. During a routine air demonstration, MiG test pilot Kvotchur 
experienced a bird strike in the starboard engine at 513ft from the ground. This 
loss of power, at an already low speed, led to a stall situation and forced Kvotchur 
to eject from his stricken aircraft. The image of the MiG-29’s nose impacting the 
ground, milliseconds before fire engulfed the aircraft, appeared the world over. 
Kvothchur’s escape from the doomed MiG also showed one the Fulcrums one of 
the many innovative feature to the Western world.
Ejection seat technology stagnated in the Soviet Union until the late 
1970’s. The new Zvezda K-36 ejection was a leap forward in aircraft egress 
technology for the Soviets, and the MiG-29 was the first to incorporate it. In fact, 
experts consider the K-36 seat to be on par, or even superior, to Western seats. In 
point of fact, the seat is now being produced under license in Connecticut. The 
seat was also seen in action during the 1993 Royal International Air Tattoo in 
Fairford, England; two Russian MiG-29’s collided whilst performing an aerial 
display.
By showing the MiG-29’s incredible agility and, tragically, its K-36 
ejection seat, these early airshows gave the West an unparalleled, close look at the 
MiG-29. During the 1988 visit to Finland it was revealed that the aircraft has 
large doors in front of the air intakes that close while the aircraft was on, or near, 
the ground. Air for the engines was supplied by vents on top of the aircraft during
Connecticut, Department o f  Economic and Community Development. “Governor Rowland 
Announces IBP Aerospace Facility Will Create 200 Jobs in East Hartford” December 1, 1998. 
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this period. Speculation ran wild as to the reason for this design feature, but 
deputy designer Waldenberg stated it was simply to avoid FOD (Foreign Object 
Debris) from entering and damaging the engines when the aircraft was operating 
from unimproved airfields. Additionally the MiG-29 can also fly at speeds up to 
800km/h with the doors closed, perhaps to prevent bird strike damage.
Two very interesting features of the MiG-29’s fire control system were 
also revealed. First, the 30mm Gryazev/Shipunov GSh-30-1 single barreled 
cannon is extremely accurate, thanks to it’s coupling to a laser range finder and 
the Doppler radar system. Though the MiG-29 only carries 150 rounds (or five 
seconds of firing), few rounds are necessary before a hit can be attained.
Secondly, and more importantly, the MiG-29 pilots can use a helmet mounted 
sight to track enemy aircraft. This feature is very valuable when combined with 
the R-73 (NATO codename AA-11 ARCHER) missile featuring thrust vectoring 
capabilities. This system allows a MiG-29 pilot to engage an enemy without using 
telltale radar, giving the MiG-29 less possibility of being detected. However, the 
true advantage of the system is its flexibility. It allows the pilot to shoot at an 
aircraft up to 45° off bore sight of the nose. This ability reduces the amount of 
maneuver required before a shot can be taken, the entire point of dogfighting. 
German pilots who flew the MiG-29 in Luftwaffe service after reumfication said 
that, “The helmet mounted sight is a real advantage when it comes to 
engagements requiring a visual id e n tif ica tio n .D esp ite  the advantages offered 
by the MiG-29, the German pilot then illuminates one of the key problems with
Spick pg 489 
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aircraft. “It offers no advantage in BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagements, 
however, unless you can enter a short range fight, which is not likely against as 
AMRAAM^^^-equipped opponents.” This observation would besome painfully 
evident for MiG-29 pilots over Serbia and Iraq.
Indeed, the original MiG-29 suffered in many areas, including radar. MiG- 
29 A’s did not have a viable BVR capability. It’s radar was not powerful enough 
nor could it carry long range missiles. Alpha (NATO phonetic alphabet for A) 
model Fulcrums also lacked a fly by wire system, instead they relied on 
antiquated hydraulics that increased pilot fatigue and compromised 
maneuverability in high G situations. Also not included on the A model were 
hardpoints for external fuel tanks. This was something which was desperately 
needed owing to the small internal fuel supply. Later models such as the M1G-29S 
(SE for export) alleviated most of these issues with the incorporation of fly-by- 
wire systems, external fuel tanks, improved radar and the ability to fire the new 
BVR R-77 Vympel missile.
The ergonomics of the cockpit were not improved upon in the S model, 
something which German pilots, having flown Western aircraft, had difficulty 
dealing with. According to Luftwaffe Capt. Michael Raubbach “Just to get a 
simple lock on and fire a missile may take up to half a dozen hands off stick 
switches. German pilots complained the switches were not laid out in a logical 
manner. This was a problem as most basic operations required an inordinate 
amount of movement within the cockpit, by MiG this rectified somewhat with the
Advanced Medium Range Air to Air M issile fielded by NATO as the AIM -120. The missile is 
radar guided and capable o f  accurate long range interceptions.
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introduction of the MiG-29SMT, which incorporated a glass cockpit and was, too 
a large degree, compatible with Western avionics. Maintenance is also not up to 
Western standards; a replacement o f the RD-33 engines being required every 400 
hours.
Most of the world’s MiG-29s that have seen combat are Alpha models, 
thus the shortcoming were quite apparent. However, as the Luftwaffe JG73 
squadron flying the MiG-29A have shown, the MiG-29 is still a formidable 
aircraft. According to its own pilots the MiG is capable of holding its own against 
such aircraft as the F-16 and F/A-18 Hornet. As one F-16 pilot pointed out 
“whoever makes the first mistake (in a close range fight) loses” In fact one 
pilot claims it to be “more then capable”.T h o u g h  the German pilots have 
proved the MiG-29 to be a worthy aircraft, it is only such when in the hands of a 
capable, well trained pilot. Though dreadful the combat record of the MiG-29 
proves without a doubt the value of training and proficiency.
Spick pg 492
Hehs, In comparison the F-16 Pratt and Whitney’s 200 series engines require replacement 
every 4,000 hours.
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The Fulcrum in Combat: A Story o f  Woe
The baptism of fire for the Fulcrum was by no means glorious. The Gulf 
War of 1991 was a one-sided victory for the Coalition forces against Iraq. The 
war in the air was no different. Coalition forces followed the model of airspace 
domination set forth by the Israelis during 1982. On the first night of the war, 
January 17, 1991, US and Coalition aircraft attacked airfields, radars, GCI sites 
and command and control bunkers. They destroyed Iraq anti-aircraft defense 
network, crippled its ground based fighter control system and decimated most 
airfields very quickly. The night of January 17 was also the first combat for the 
MiG-29 Fulcrum.
After strikes by F-I17 Stealth fighters focused on C  ̂targets in Baghdad, 
F-111 and F-15E’s began attacking the air defense network around the capital 
city. Top cover was provided by USAF F-ISC’s and USN F-14 ’s. During the 
ingress to the target, two Iraqi fighters managed to get airborne and challenge the 
attackers. However a comedy of errors ensued. As the lead MiG-23 crossed in 
front o f his wingman that was flying a MiG-29, the wingman fired and destroyed 
his comrade. Just after his ffatricidical maneuver, the MiG-29 flew into the 
ground. To say the least, this was not a elegant combat debut for the MiG-29.
G ulf War Air Power Survey Volume II: Operations and Effects and Effectiveness. US 
Government Printing Office. Washington D.C. 1993 pg 125
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An Iraqi MIG-29A
As the F-15E’s and F-11 Ts egressed from attacking their targets, another 
group of fighters rose from H-2 or H-3 air base. AWACS (Airborne Warnings and 
Control Systems) picked up the fighters closing with a group of F-15’s heading 
for a tanker to refuel. The top cover F-15C’s, (callsign Pennzoil and Citgo) were 
vectored to intercept. At sixteen miles, the target was identified as a lone MiG-29 
and the lead F-15 fired a long range AIM-7 Sparrow missile. Apparently, the MiG 
pilot did not realize he had been fired upon, and continued to climb, taking no 
evasive action as the missile struck and destroyed the aircraft. Later that night, 
two more MiG-29’s were downed by Citgo and Pennzoil flights.
Two days later, on January 19, the MiG-29 made another poor showing. 
Captains Caesar Rodriguez and Craig Underhill were performing a daylight 
fighter sweep near the Baghdad area when they detected two MiG-29’s. As the F- 
15 flight tracked the two MiG-29’s they were bounced by another two undetected 
MiG-29's. Very quickly one the MiG’s obtained missile-lock on Rodriguez. For 
some reason the MiG did not fire, though Rodriguez was “well within his
artwork courtesy o f  Tom Cooper ACIG.org editor 
G ulf War Air Power Survey vol II pg 126
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range” Rodriguez performed a maneuver to break lock and used his F-15’s 
ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) gear to spoil any shot; “I kept him off until 
Underwood would target and take him out.” *̂̂  Underwood obtained a lock and 
fired a single AIM-7 that destroyed the MiG behind Rodriguez. With this threat 
eliminated, Rodriguez engaged the remaining MiG-29 in a classic turning 
dogfight. The fight began at 8,000ft and very quickly descended to 300ft. Finally, 
when neither pilot could obtain an optimum firing position, the MiG performed a 
split-S maneuver, miscalculated and flew into the ground. Rodriguez was credited 
with a kill by maneuver. Two MiG-29’s were also killed by F-15C’s on February 
15 as they attempted to flee eastwards to Iran.
American F-15’s were credited with five MiG-29 kills They had also 
watched two crash into the ground whilst attempting an intercept. The subject of 
much discussion, the reasons for these two crashing is generally blamed on the 
heads down configuration of the MiG-29 A radar and fire control system. It was 
not possible to both, fly the aircraft in an offensive manner, track a target, and fire 
a missile and while still watching outside the cockpit. This problem was later 
described by German Luftwaffe pilots as they transitioned to the MiG-29.
The air war during the first Gulf War progressed much the same as Israeli 
operations over the Bekka Valley. Coalition aircraft controlled the airspace and 
decimated the Iraq air defense network. When opposing aircraft did manage 
takeoff to intercept, they lacked coherent control and a good situational picture of 
the surroundings. Thus, the Iraqi pilots were easy targets for US fighter sweeps.
Grant, Rebecca. “The Missing Aces” Air Force Magaize, The Journal o f the Air Force 
Association Online. Sept 2004 vol 87 no 9. http://www.afa.org/magazine/Sept2004/0904aces.httnl 
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Additionally, the Iraqi experience during the Iran-Iraq war gave advantage to the 
Coalition. During that conflict neither side had attempted to dominate the air they 
instead relyed on their respective armies to achieve victory in the battlefield. It 
was Saddam Hussein’s decision to put his aircraft in supposed bombproof 
shelters, riding out the initial air strikes that crippled the Iraqi air force for the 
remainder of the war. Hussein relied on his vast air defense network to blunt 
coalition airstikes, rather than his air force.
The MiG-29 did not fair well during the Gulf War due to the low skill 
level of its pilots, the vast destruction of the defense network, and the high 
proficiency level o f coalition pilots. These same variables would doom the MiG- 
29 in its next combat performance over the skies of the Balkans.
Yugoslavia received its first MiG-29’s in 1987 from the Soviet Union. 
These were not new aircraft, in fact they were some of the first MiG-29’s 
produced. They had been flown by the VVS and then put into storage prior to 
their sale to Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia broke up in 1991, the MiG-29’s were 
under the control o f Serbia (Serbia at the time, still referred to itself as 
Yugoslavia). During the civil wars that racked the Balkans in the 1990’s, MiG- 
29’s were employed to fly CAP (Combat Air Patrol) missions along the borders 
of Austria, and later, flew numerous ground attack missions against the Bosnians 
and Croatians. Croatia and Bosnia claimed to have destroyed at least four MiG-
Keaney, Thomas A and Eliot A. Cohen. G ulf War Air Power Survey Summary Repoit. (US 
Government Printing Office. 1993) pg 56
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29’s during the war, but post war analysis by NATO revealed that all fourteen 
aircraft survived the civil wars/^^
When Serbia was confronted by NATO in 1999, the condition of all MiG- 
29’s was very poor. All MiG-29’s were assigned to one squadron, the 127̂  ̂
Fighter Aviation Squadron based at Batajanica airfield near Belgrade. The pilots 
of this squadron were only averaging only twenty flying hours a year, hardly 
enough to stay proficient. The MiG-29’s were maintained very poorly, with 
rarely more then five aircraft deemed flight ready. Thus, when ordered by 
Belgrade to sortie against incoming NATO fighters, only five aircraft were 
serviceable and were spread out to among dispersed airfields.
On March 24, 1999, during the early hours of Operation Allied Force, 
three MiG-29’s were scrambled from Batajanica airfield to intercept incoming 
allied fighter-bombers. As the flight gained altitude the MiG-29’s were picked up 
by a British E-3D Sentry AWACS aircraft patrolling over the Adriatic. Also in the 
area were four Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16AM’s assigned to CAP duty 
around Belgrade. After being vectored into the area of the MiG’s, the four F- 
16AM’s detected the lead aircraft on radar. The lead pilot shot an AIM-120 
AMRAAM eighteen kilometers from the target. Soon after he reported a “large 
fiery explosion” and was informed by the AWACS that the MiG had disappeared 
fi*om radar. This was the first Dutch air-to-air victory since the Second World
188 “Yugoslav and Serbian M iG-29s” Air Combat Information Group Jourpah Oct 2003. 
htto://www.acig.org/artman/publish/articie 380.shtml
Dawes, Alan “Surviving NATO Shootdowns” Air Forces Monthly. (July 1999 pg 70-71) pg 71 
Jok, Joris Jannsen. “How Dutch F-16AM ’s shot down a MiG-29” Janes Defence Weekly. May 
1999. http://www.janes.coni/defence/news/kosovo/jdw990401 0 I n.shtml
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War. The other two MiG-29’s exited the area at high speed and avoided contact 
with the Dutch F-16’s.
Luck ran out quickly for the two escaping Fulcrums, however, as they 
were tracked by AWACS aircraft. USAF Col. Caesar Rodriguez, who had 
downed two MiG’s during the Gulf War flying a F-15C, was vectored to the two 
remaining MiG-29’s. One of the MiG-29’s was on course to intercept a flight of 
incoming F-117 Stealth Fighters. According to the MiG-29 pilot. Major Iljo 
Arizano, he detected a number of targets, among them an F-117. Firing a missile 
at the Stealth Fighter, he missed. Whilst moving to reengage it, Arizano’s aircraft 
was struck by a missile in the rear fuselage and entered an uncontrollable spin. As 
smoke filled the cockpit Arizano decided to eject and landed in a vineyard 
southwest of Pristina. He was downed an AIM-120 AMRAAM fired by Col 
Rodriquez.
Just as this engagement concluded, USAF Capt. Michael Showers 
detected two MiG-29’s departing the airfield at Batajanica. Capt. Showers was 
escorting a flight o f F-117 Stealth Fighters, when the two MiG’s began an 
intercept on his flight; Showers engaged them with two AIM-120 AMRAAMS’s. 
However both missiles missed their mark. As the MiG’s closed with Showers he 
described the situation, “I didn’t think I had a choice of turning and running away, 
you’ve got a MiG-29 running around in the area, and there is a chance he could 
get lucky and find a S t e a l t h . S u r p r i s i n g  an F-117 pilot who was only 2,000ft 
from in front of his aircraft. Showers launched another AMRAAM, which found
Air Force Monthly July 1999 71 
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its mark, and destroyed a MiG-29 piloted by Major Nebojsa Nikolic. Nikiolic 
later claimed he had engaged and fired an AA-8 Aphid missile at his attacker but 
this was never verified.
Two days later, two MiG-29’s were scrambled to intercept a high flying 
NATO reconnaissance aircraft that was flying north west over Serbia. As they 
climbed to intercept the aircraft, both MiG-29’s began to experience malfunctions 
Avith their radar systems. Directed by GCI the two aircraft attempted a visual 
intercept of the NATO aircraft as it crossed the Bosnian border. As their radars 
malfunctioned, they failed to detect a flight of USAF F-15C led by ANG Capt. 
Jeffery Hwang. The Mig-29’s were both shot down by AIM-120 AMRAAMS 
before they could take evasive action.
Air Force Monthly July 1999 71 
Air Force Monthly June 1999 21
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Photos o f MiG-29 downed by Capt. Hwang over Bosnia
all pictures o f  downed MiG-29 are courtesy o f  Sgt. Colby Jackson who visited the wrecked 
while serving with SFOR as part o f  the Montana 163^ National Guard in 2002
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Despite the fact that they had failed to score a single kill against Allied 
aircraft, Serbian MiG-29"s continued to challenge Allied aircraft. The last MiG-29 
kill o f the conflict occurred on May 4, 1999 when two F-16CJ’s engaged a single 
MiG-29, destroying it very quickly with another AMRAAM.
Intercepts by MiG-29’s during Operation Allied Force were doomed to 
fail from the beginning. Flight hours were as low as twenty a year and no pilot 
had the proficiency enough to engage NATO pilots on an equal footing. 
Additional, the MiG-29’s, were in a poor state of repair. Of a fleet of 14, only six 
were able to fly. Of those MiG-29’s, a major malfunction was reported in either a 
radar or fire control system during every flight. By the spring o f 2004, Serbia 
could not maintain the aircraft and MiG-29 operations ceased.
The skies over eastern Africa would be the next combat arena for the 
Fulcrums as Ethiopia and Eritrea were fighting over land disputes stemming from 
the Eritrean war o f independence. Since 1990 Ethiopia and Eritrea had long 
endured a simmering border conflict over the Badme area. Hostilities erupted 
numerous times and in 1997 Ethiopia, with the help of the Russian mercenary 
group Rosvoorouzhenie, began to import Su-27 Flanker fighters. Eritrea, lest it 
fall behind in the arms race, purchased a number of MiG-29A from a Ukraiman 
mercenary company. Due in part to friction within the Rosvoorouzhenie 
Company, Russians within the company supported the Ethiopians, while the 
Ukrainians supported Eritrea! The Ukrainians broke from the firm and worked
Cooper, Tom “II Ethiopian Eritrean War, 1998-2000” Air Combat Information Group 
Journal.(Sept 2003) http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_189.shtml
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exclusively for Eritrea. Eritrean pilots were sent to Ukraine for a crash course on 
the MiG-29. This was a great step up as they previously flown fairly simple 
Italian Aermacchi MB.339’s. In February of 1999 tensions flared into open 
hostilities.
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During the morning of February 25̂ '̂ 1999, four MiG-29 A’s, piloted by 
Eritrean pilots, intercepted two Su-27’s flown by Russian mercenaries near the 
disputed area. The Fulcrums bounced the two Russians, firing a salvo of AA-10 
missiles. All missed. After evading the missiles, the Russians turned and engaged 
the Eritrean’s. The MiG-29’s could not evade the faster Flankers and one was shot
197 http://zhenghe.tripod.com/maps/eritrea.jpg
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down, reportedly flown by the Eritrean Air Force commander. Brig. Gen. Habte 
Zion Hadgu.^^®
The next day, a lone Su-27, flown by a female Ethiopian pilo,t came 
across an unarmed Eritrean two seat MiG-29UB, apparently out on a training 
flight. After a good deal of maneuvering, the female pilot gained firing position 
on the MiG. In one of the more unusual events in aerial warfare, the Ethiopian 
contacted the MiG, requesting he relent to be escorted to an Ethiopian airfield. 
Upon hearing the other pilots voice, she realized it was her former instructor, a 
pilot who had defected and was now flying for Eritrea. After a lengthy discussion, 
the Ethiopian shot her former instructor down with 30mm gunfire. She was the 
first woman to score an aerial victory in a jet aircraft.
Hostilities continued and on March 18, a pair of MiG-29's were shot down 
by Russian flown Su-27’s. This victory led to the temporary withdrawal of 
Eritrean MiG-29’s from the battlefield. However, on May 16, 2000 they made a 
reappearance to challenge Ethiopian Su-27’s again. In the ensuing battle one 
MiG-29 was shot down quickly, while the other crash landed at the airport in 
Asmara after being hit by an R-73 from one of the Ethiopian Flankers. This was 
the last known operational use of the Eritrean MiG-29’s.̂ ^̂
Interesting in this conflict was the battle between the MiG’s and it W S  
stable mate, the Su-27. Though the Su-27 is larger and supposedly less 
maneuverable, nearly every battle was a turning fight, one in which the MiG was 
supposed to excel. Also apparent were the skills of the Russian mercenaries.
Cooper
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especially against relatively poorly trained Eritrean pilots. This plays poorly for 
MiG OKB as they struggle to increase sales against their competitor Sukhoi. If 
MiG is to increase sales, its aircraft must perform well, especially against it prime 
economic competition. Performance in well trained and experienced hands, such 
as the German Luftwaffe or Indian Air Force, has shown the MiG-29 Fulcrum to 
be a worthy adversary; however in the hands of an inexperienced or poorly 
supported pilot it has no chance to prove its worth.
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C hapter IX
Conclusion
Many lessons can be drawn from MiG’s aircraft combat performance. 
These lessons include the value of highly trained pilots and ground personnel, a 
competent C3 structure and situational awareness in combat. Without any of these 
factors and when faced by a force proficient in all aspects of them, pilots are 
doomed to failure.
Many Western aviation authors and researchers are convinced of the 
supremacy of Western aircraft. They have often looked upon Soviet/Russian 
aviation as a generation behind not a threat to Western aircraft. This is a 
dangerous assumption which must be avoided. Any aircraft with a proficient pilot, 
regardless of the state of technology, should be regarded as a threat. The Western 
aircraft design industry, as well as the air force it supplies, is dominated by 
technology. Though pilot training in the US and other Western countries is the 
best in the world, the industry and tacticians focus on the role of technology in 
warfare. While playing a large role in success on the battlefield, technology is not 
the end all it is sometimes portrayed as. The human brain is still the fastest, most 
advanced part of any weapons system.
Soviet aircraft have had a reputation as being inferior to their Western 
counterparts. In part this is due to a history of combat failures, examples of which 
have been examined in this study. However, as any historian knows, the danger 
lies in taking something out of the context of time or place. All current MiG
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designs were created during the Cold War, a time of tense nerves and nuclear 
brinkmanship. Whereas Western design firms marketed and relied on foreign 
sales, Soviet era OKB s had but a single customer. Any foreign sales were 
negotiated by the Soviet government and were not the concern of the company. 
MiG OKB was tasked with equipping the VVS and PVO with frontline fighters 
and fighter/bombers; it did not design aircraft for foreign customers. Therefore the 
OKB's designs were quite specialized. Had a war occurred in Europe involving 
the Soviet Union and NATO, Soviet aircraft might well be considered in a 
different light.
The Soviet Union relied on superior numbers on the battlefield for victory. 
The W S  and PVO possessed far more aircraft then NATO, though not as 
advanced. The role of the Soviet Air Force differed from its Western counterpart. 
The W S  and PVO were to support the advancing army by disrupting NATO air 
operations. They were expected to sustain heavy losses, offset by their numerical 
superiority. Luckily, this scenario never occurred. However, along with military 
hardware the tactics that would have been employed by the W S  were exported to 
Soviet client states resulting in poor performance by Soviet designed aircraft.
The air war over North Korea placed the MiG-15 in an environment for 
which it was designed, point defense of static targets from fighters and bombers. 
When coupled with quality Soviet pilots, the MiG-15 excelled in this role. 
However, though flying the same aircraft, relatively untrained North Korean and 
Chinese pilots suffered heavy losses in the same role. This was a direct result of 
poor, insufficient pilot training.
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When MiG’s rose to meet American fighters and bombers over Vietnam 
their initial success was limited due to lack of training. As the war progressed the 
NVAF, aided by restrictions imposed on American pilots by the US government, 
greatly improved their performance. They broke from traditional Soviet tactics 
and developed their own indigenous ones, suited to the varied combat over 
Vietnam. This was especially important to the NVAF as they did not possess 
numerical superiority. North Vietnam also possessed a very advanced GCI system 
that vectored and provided information to pilots quickly and effectively. 
Eventually the NVAF produced thirteen aces, due in part to the pilot’s initiative 
and ability to operate independently from the Soviet model. Ten years later Syrian 
pilots discovered the fallacy of exporting a tactical doctrine ill suited for the 
environment.
When Syrian and Israeli aircraft engaged one another over the skies of the 
Bekka Valley in 1982, the Soviet system became the laughing stock of air forces 
the world over. The Syrian Air Force suffered heavy losses to the guns and 
missiles of the lAF for numerous reasons. Though the SyAF was flying highly 
advanced and capable MiG-23’s, they could not be employed in an effective 
manner. Syrian pilots were not proficient in ACM, lacked all personal initiative in 
battle and did not maintain C3 control. They were highly dependent on the Soviet 
system of GCI to intercept lAF aircraft. When this was lost, so too was their 
situational awareness as they had not been taught the skills necessary to continue 
the battle independently. The MiG’s over the Bekka Valley were destroyed in 
record number due to organizational and pilot error, not because the hardware was
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inferior. Unfortunately for MiG, its aircraft continued to suffer throughout the 
1990’s at the hands of inexperienced pilots.
The loss of MiG-29's in both Gulf War I and Yugoslavia was the direct 
result of poor pilot skill. In one aforementioned case, a MiG-29 shot down his 
wingman, and then crashed into the ground while being engaged by American F- 
15’s. Over Bosnia and Serbia, MiG-29*s were not serviced to a combat ready 
status and sent into battle deaf, dumb and blind. No aircraft can be expected to 
survive in such an atmosphere.
Despite the horrendous combat record of MiG-29’s there is hope. The 
German Luftwaffes demonstrated unequivocally during the 1990’s showed that 
with a well-trained pilot a MiG-29 could defeat Western aircraft. The key to this 
success is not an innovative fire control system or excellent maneuverability, but 
rather the human brain within the cockpit.
In aerial combat the most significant factor is still the human factor. To 
win in aerial conflicts, countries must have necessary resources and willingness to 
train pilots effectively. They cannot rely on technology alone to dominate the 
battlefield. Though MiG aircraft have not performed since 1950 as well as their 
Western counterparts, the fault lies not in their design, but in their 
implementation. A multimillion-dollar aircraft is worthless without a 
multimillion-dollar pilot, a fact that many countries fail to understand.
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Epilogue
The Future of MiG: Can a Soviet Era OKB Survive in Today’s Market
Economy?
MiG is struggling to cope with the former Soviet Union’s new economic 
situation. Gone is the VVS and MoD guidance for aircraft design. Instead Russian 
OKB’s must design aircraft marketable to a broad audience. Gone also are the 
vast amount of funds available under Soviet rule. Now OKB’s must lobby for 
money from either governments or private sources, much like their Western 
counterparts. Today the production lines of MiG are at a near standstill, producing 
aircraft to replace fleet attrition losses. The design bureau is still producing and 
researching upgrade packages for aircraft such as the MiG-21, -29 and -31, but is 
falling behind other companies in particular, MiG has taken a backseat to lAI 
(Israeli Aircraft Industries) which is marketing upgrade packages for many 
Eastern European Fishbed operators. MiG has made a number of partnerships 
with the hope of staying competitive.
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, MiG merged with its key 
production facility, MAPO (Moscow Aircraft Production Organization)^®^ 
creating MIG-MAPO.^®^ The group acquired the helicopter company, Kamov, and 
sought foreign partners such as Singapore based. Agio Countertrade. Business is 
still slow, perhaps due to MiG ties with former head bureau chief, Belyakov.
Norman, Iain. The Fall o f MiG or How Sukhoi Stole the Spotlight. Unpublished Manuscript 
MIG, with a capital I, now stands for M oscow Industrial Group, however the aircraft design 
bureau is still known as MiG.
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Belyakov backed the coup which attempted to oust Yeltsin from power and relied 
very heavily on friendships in the old Soviet VVS to maintain funding for aircraft 
p r o g r a m s . H i s  retirement from the company in 1995 is construed some as a 
blessing. MiG’s main competitor, Sukhoi, has done remarkably well in the post 
Soviet era, It has sold its premier fighter the SU-27 (and variants thereof) to many 
countries outside the old Soviet sphere o f influence. Unlike Sukhoi, MiG has not 
learned the value and skill of marketing.
During the years o f drastic inflation right after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, there were reports that the-ehief o f the Sukhoi bureau traded sport aircraft 
for Toyotas. By doing this, Sukhoi avoided the drastic deflation of the ruble. 
Dollars that were made were securely banked in the West. Sukhoi has made a 
point to bring its Su-27 to as many large airshows as possible to wow crowds and 
diplomats alike with its fantastic maneuverability. Sukhoi changed the historical 
method of simply assigning a letter at the end of the aircraft to denote a new 
version (i.e. MiG-29S/SE/K etc), instead they renumber each new derivative (i.e. 
Su-30, Su-33, Su-35 all variations of the Su-27), thereby making the aircraft seem 
like a new design.^^^ Sukhoi has, for all practical purposes, unseated MiG as the 
premier Russian design OKB. All is not lost for MiG though, and there may be 
hope for the struggling company.
India has recently acquired nearly 30 M1G-29K aircraft to operate firom 
their former Soviet aircraft ca r r i e r . M a la y s ia  has also recently purchased MiG-
Tartar
manuscript o f  Iain Norman
Kappan, Rasheed. “Indo-Russian Deal on MiG-29K Ready” The Hindu Online Flndial. 
February 11, 2001. http://www.hindu.eom/thehindu/2001/02/l 1/stories/02110004.htm
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29’s and MiG is seeking to expand into commercial aircraft production with the 
MiG-110. MiG also is developing the stealthy MiG 1.44, designed as a fifth 
generation fighter, although this project seems to be stalled. As of early 2003, the 
MiG Corporation was offering the MiG-21-93 upgrade program, the MiG-23-98 
upgrade program for this maintenance intensive aircraft, a cockpit upgrade for 
MiG-27’s, the MiG-29 as the basic A and advanced S version, the carrier borne K 
version and finally an the MiG-31 as a whole aircraft for China and the VVS/PVO 
or as an upgrade package to existing airframes.^®^
MiG must stay competitive with Sukhoi in order to survive. Efforts abroad 
at marketing and upgrading current versions will be the company’s only salvation. 
The Su-27 was in respect a poor choice for many nations that have already bought 
it. The aircraft is expensive to buy and to maintain, whereas the MiG-29 is 
cheaper and less maintenance intensive. MiG must effectively market the strong 
points o f its current offering, much as it did with the Indian Navy and continue to 
research and develop its military and commercial designs. If MiG does not do 
this, it will not survive. In thirty years MiG may have made an admirable 
comeback or it will be only an entry in history books like so many of its 
predecessors. If MiG dies, with it goes the legacy of the premier designer o f the 
Cold War Soviet era and a name that so many people worldwide associate with 
fighter aircraft. The design bureaus death Avill be a sad day indeed.
manuscript o f  Iain Norman
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A p p e n d i x
All Flow charts from General Dynamics via Piotr Butowski and Jay Miller 
OKB MiG: A History of the Design Bureau and its Aircraft. Aerofax Press,
Leicester 1991
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